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INTRODUCTION
For over six decades, police in Taiwan 1 could lock up
people they deemed “hooligans” (liumang)2 for years with at
most a cursory review by the courts. It was not until Taiwan’s
Constitutional Court (the “Court”)—also known as the Grand
Justices of the Judicial Yuan—stepped in that important change
began to occur, culminating in the ultimate repeal of the law
1. In this Article, we use “Taiwan” to refer to the territory under the effective
control of the Republic of China (“ROC”) government (including the island of Taiwan
itself as well as Matsu, Penghu, and Kinmen (a.k.a. Jinmen or Quemoy)), unless
otherwise specified.
2. We use the pinyin Romanization of the Chinese characters for the term instead
of translating “liumang” into English. Considering the lengthy development of the
unique concept of liumang in Taiwan, it is not surprising that the term does not lend
itself to easy translation. Varyingly translated as “hooligan,” “hoodlum,” and
“gangster,” liumang does not fit squarely into the definition of any of these words.
Hooligan raises images of youth and especially young sports fans who have crossed the
line from exuberant to destructive behavior. Although hoodlum does not carry the
same youthful connotation, it still implies a certain thuggish quality that does not
necessarily embrace the full panoply of liumang behavior. The nuances among the
various terms related to “hooliganitis” were humorously explored in a 1981 New York
Times piece. See William Safire, On Language, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 16, 1981, at 9.
Finally, “gangster,” by definition, indicates that the person is involved in some sort of
shady, if not blatantly criminal, organization. Although the concept of liumang
includes people involved in gangs, a person can act entirely independently when
engaging in liumang behavior. “Liumang” further has a non-legal aspect and has
played into popular culture both in Taiwan and Mainland China. For example, in his
article titled Wang Shuo and Liumang (‘Hooligan’) Culture, Geremie Barmé explains,
“Liumang is a word with some of the most negative connotations in the Chinese
language. Here the expression is used loosely in an attempt to describe both a social
phenomenon and its cultural refraction.” Geremie Barmé, Wang Shuo and Liumang
(‘Hooligan’) Culture, 28 AUSTL. J. CHINESE AFF. 23, 28 (1992). As with the term
“liumang,” the Liumang Act has a variety of translations, most notably “Act for the
Prevention of Gangsters,” “Anti-Hoodlum Law,” and “Anti-Hooligan Act.”
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that authorized the police-dominated process. As a result, in
2009, all of Taiwan’s imprisoned liumang who did not have
concurrent criminal sentences were released.
The path toward abolition—albeit winding, long, and
complex—is a glowing example of the judiciary, executive, and
legislature carrying out their respective duties in a democratic,
cooperative, and relatively transparent manner. In particular,
the often-overlooked Court played an essential role in curbing
police power. This Article discusses the detailed process by
which judges, officials, and legislators—spurred by civic groups,
lawyers and academics—brought about annulment of the
relevant legislation, the Act for Eliminating Liumang (
) (The “Liumang Act” or “LMA”). Crucial to this process
was a series of Court interpretations, combined with sustained
efforts by law reform groups and a gradual realization by the
legislative and executive branches that the Liumang Act could
no longer be justified as compatible with the values of postmartial-law, democratic Taiwan. The Court’s gradual
invalidation of various provisions of the Liumang Act was a
necessary, albeit standing alone insufficient, force behind the
Act’s ultimate abolition.
Part I of this Article introduces the former legal regime for
punishing liumang. Part II takes a step back to explain how the
Court functions and the scope of its powers. We address the
Court’s initial interpretations regarding the punishment of
liumang in Part III, followed in Part IV by a detailed analysis of
the final interpretation and the two underlying petitions for
constitutional review that stimulated it. Part V charts the
Liumang Act’s rapid demise after the Court’s final
interpretation.
In Part VI, we look across the strait to consider what lessons
Taiwan’s experience has for the People’s Republic of China
(“PRC”) now that it has finally abolished its analogous policeimposed punishment system of re-education through labor
(“RETL”). Because of the extremely limited role of
constitutional interpretation in the PRC, reforms to RETL had
to await a purely political solution rather than a judicial decision
or even a constitutional interpretation by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress, the only PRC
institution explicitly authorized to make such an interpretation.
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The Decision of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central
Committee in late 2013 announcing that RETL would be
abolished provided the requisite political will to finally end
RETL in December 2013. Abolition of RETL is an important
milestone in the PRC’s journey to limit unfettered police power.
Serious questions remain, however, about alternative
punishment systems that are already being used in place of
RETL. The issue now is whether the PRC truly took a step
towards reining in police powers or merely shifted those powers
to different forms of so-called “administrative” punishments” as
well as increased application of some of the vaguer provisions of
PRC criminal law.3
I. THE LEGAL REGIME FOR PUNISHING LIUMANG
Taiwan, an island one hundred miles away from the
southeast coast of mainland China, was officially incorporated
into China’s territory by the Qing Dynasty in 1683. In 1895, the
Qing Dynasty, after being defeated in the first Sino-Japanese
War, ceded Taiwan and its outlying islands to Japan. In 1945,
however, at the end of World War II, Japan was forced to
renounce jurisdiction over Taiwan and the island again fell
under Chinese rule. The government of the Republic of China
(“ROC”), controlled by President Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist
Party (“Kuomintang” or “KMT”), reintegrated the island into
the ROC’s territory. After losing the Chinese Civil War to Mao
Zedong’s Communist Party on the Mainland in 1949, the KMT
regime took refuge on the island of Taiwan, which was already
under its martial law, and made the island its exclusive base for
maintaining the ROC government.
For the subsequent four decades, the KMT suspended parts
of the ROC Constitution 4 and consolidated power in the
executive branch and the military under the Temporary
Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion
3. See, e.g., Verna Yu, Labour Camps May Become a Thing of a Past, But What Will
Replace Them?, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/
print/news/china/article/1347815/labour-camps-may-become-thing-past-what-willreplace-them?utm_source=edm; infra Part VI (discussing the various police options,
legal and illegal, for replacing re-education through labor (“RETL”)).
4. MINGUO XIANFA [Constitution] (1947) (Taiwan), translated at http://english.
president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=434.
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(“Temporary Provisions”). The KMT’s “complex structure of
external and internal security organizations” wielded ultimate
power over the island.5 The KMT’s ordinarily discreet, albeit
tremendous, day-to-day police power was on full display during
several high-profile outbreaks of public unrest. Among the most
egregious exercises of repression were the violent silencing of
protestors and dissidents following the “2-28” uprising of
February 28, 1947, and the harsh government response to prodemocracy demonstrations culminating in the notorious
crackdown following the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident on
International Human Rights Day.
Throughout the martial law period, the police easily found
support for their actions in suppression-friendly laws and
regulations. Although outwardly aimed at liumang behavior,
such as gang participation and gambling activities, the relevant
legal framework—the Act for Eliminating Liumang During the
Period of Communist Rebellion (The “1985 Liumang Act”) and
its forerunner, Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing
Liumang—also provided expedient measures for silencing
political opponents who did not fit the conventional description
of liumang.6 As was the case in practice under RETL on the
Mainland, police unilaterally made the decision to condemn
liumang. The punishment imposed on liumang at the time was
the dreaded guanxun (
), translated literally as “control and
training.” However, “control and training” was, in actuality, an
extraordinarily harsh military-administered punishment that
could be used to detain perceived troublemakers indefinitely.7

5. Edwin A. Winckler, Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to
Soft Authoritarianism?, 99 CHINA Q. 481, 491 (1984).
6. See Taiwan Sheng Jieyan Shiqi Qudi Liumang Banfa (
) [Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing Liumang During the Martial Law
Period] (1955) (Taiwan) [hereinafter Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing
Liumang During the Martial Law Period], replaced in 1985 by Dongyuan Kanluan
Shiqi Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli (
) [Act for Eliminating
Liumang During the Period of Communist Rebellion] (1985) (Taiwan). The more
simply named Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli (
) [Act for Eliminating Liumang]
[hereinafter Act for Eliminating Liumang] followed in 1992 and remained in effect
until January 2009.
7. The 1955 Measures provided a powerful means of locking up people under the
guise of “studying life skills.” Taiwan Province Measures on Repressing Liumang
During the Martial Law Period, supra note 6.
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The Law for the Punishment of Police Offenses served as a
potent supplementary device for police during the martial law
period. 8 Under that law, a counterpart to the PRC’s thenprevailing Security Administration Punishment Regulations,
police could summarily detain people for up to two weeks at
local police stations for a wide range of minor offenses with no
participation by prosecutorial or court officials.9
In 1971, one scholar commented on the police’s broad
discretion: “Administrative regulations have defined an
extremely broad area within which the police have a free hand
to use whatever methods they consider effective and proper.”10
Consequently, despite the fact that the KMT had brought with it
to Taiwan the ROC’s Criminal Procedure Code (
),11
police could easily avoid the judicial process required by the
Code. Although the KMT’s tight grip on the judiciary during the
years of martial law virtually guaranteed desired outcomes if it
chose to invoke the formal criminal process, in many cases—
especially politically charged ones—it was more convenient to
bypass the judicial system by resort to administrative
punishments.
The government announced the cancellation of martial law
on July 15, 1987, but the actual transition of power from military
to civilian authorities took several years. The government only
abolished the Temporary Provisions in 1991 and did not dissolve
the feared Taiwan Garrison Command that presided over the
military justice system until July 31, 1992, marking the definitive
shift to civilian control.
In contrast to the entrenched police repression on the
Mainland under Communist rule, the past twenty years have
witnessed a startling transformation of Taiwan’s criminal justice
8. Wei Jing Fa Fa (
) [Law for the Punishment of Police Offenses]
(promulgated Sept. 3, 1943, effective Oct. 1, 1943, last amendment Oct. 21, 1954)
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawContent.aspx?PCODE=
D0080077.
9. For a detailed description of policing practices in Taiwan, see generally Jeffrey
Martin, A Reasonable Balance of Law and Sentiment: Social Order in Democratic Taiwan from
the Policeman’s Point of View, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 665 (2007).
10. Lung-Sheng Tao, Reform of the Criminal Process in Nationalist China, 19 AM. J.
COMP. L. 747, 764 (1971).
) [Criminal Procedure Code] (promulgated
11. XINGSHI SUSONG Fa (
July 28, 1928, amended June 23, 2010) (Taiwan), available at http://
db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp.
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system. Perhaps the most immediately notable shift was the
transformation of the draconian, military-run guanxun into the
Ministry of Justice’s ganxun (
) or “reformatory training,” a
more conventional form of imprisonment for which judicial
review, albeit truncated, was required in every case.
Even during the waning years of martial law, Taiwan began
to see the beginnings of judicial involvement in decisions that
had formerly been left exclusively to the police. The 1985
Liumang Act had introduced the use of special “public security
tribunals” (
) within the district courts to determine
whether allegedly serious liumang should be incarcerated, but
those courts provided little check, both because of daunting
procedural barriers to mounting a defense and the courts’
general pro-KMT/police propensity.12 Even the 1992 version of
the Liumang Act changed little with regard to procedures, as the
police continued to have tremendous discretion to incarcerate
people for up to three years. This discretion was meaningfully
reined in only when the Constitutional Court became involved,
as detailed in Parts III and IV below.
The gradual decline in the previously unfettered
punishment powers of Taiwan’s police must be viewed within
the larger context of reforms to the criminal justice system that
had gathered strong support. Beginning in the late 1990s,
Taiwan’s Criminal Procedure Code underwent seismic changes,
even while further reforms to the procedures for liumang cases
appeared to stall and court review of serious liumang cases
remained behind closed doors without any prosecutorial
involvement and using heavily truncated judicial proceedings.
The National Judicial Reform Conference in 1999 laid out
the framework for sweeping criminal procedure reforms that
introduced a “reformed adversarial system” (
). This reform sought to elevate the roles of defense counsel
and prosecutors in the courtroom, shift judges to a more neutral
position and place the burden of proof squarely on the

12. Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a
Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 531, 554 (2002) (“In the
context of authoritarian rule, the KMT judicial authorities usually paid limited
attention to the dignity or human rights of the accused.”).
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prosecutors.13 As reforms progressed, the judiciary, legislature,
and executive gradually recognized the untenable gap between
the new procedures applied to “criminal” cases and those used
for “liumang” cases. The fact that suspected liumang often faced
concurrent criminal charges for the same acts underscored the
overlap between the Liumang Act and the Criminal Code (
)
and cast further doubt on the perceived continuing need for the
Act.
Over time it became clear that the Liumang Act was
increasingly anachronistic when viewed against Taiwan’s
Criminal Procedure Code Yet, as Taiwan’s criminal justice
system cruised forward to embrace sweeping reforms, the
Liumang Act somehow fell off the bandwagon and was left
stumbling to catch up. For years, the Liumang Act remained an
aberration, but unique is not the same as unconstitutional. As
explained in more detail below, the Constitutional Court heard
challenges to the Liumang Act in 1995 and 2001, yet both times
the Court, while taking certain responsive actions, declined to
strike down the Act in its entirety. The Legislative Yuan, in turn,
revised the Liumang Act in response to each constitutional
interpretation, but the main substance of the Act remained
intact. After the Court’s 2001 interpretation, reformers became
concerned that the momentum behind abolishing the Liumang
Act had all but ceased.
Then, in the fall of 2007, the Justices solicited opinions
from legal experts on two additional petitions challenging the
constitutionally of the Liumang Act that had been long pending
before the Court.14 The hope among critics of the Act was that
the Court would finally hold that the entire Act was
unconstitutional. Instead, in Interpretation No. 636 issued on
February 1, 2008,15 the Court held only that the Liumang Act
had to again be revised in a piecemeal fashion, as had been

13. Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the Overlooked Challenge
of Efficiency-Driven Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 665–66 (2009).
14. As noted below, petitions for constitutional interpretations are not publicly
available, which means that people either learn their contents through the legal
grapevine or only when the Constitutional Court publishes its decision to accept or
reject the petition. Infra Part II.
15. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008), translated at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=636.
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done in 1995 and 2001 in Interpretation Nos. 38416 and 523,17
respectively. It was the Court's view that, in its capacity as the
guardian of the ROC Constitution, it was not the Court’s job to
demand repeal of the entire Liumang Act if more modest action
was sufficient to solve the constitutional infirmities. As a result,
the fate of the Liumang Act once again shifted to the legislature,
which had to decide whether to repeal the Act or keep it alive,
albeit in an increasingly altered form.
Interpretation No. 636 apparently persuaded Taiwan’s
political elite that the Liumang Act was proving to be more
trouble than it was worth. After President Ma Ying-jeou took
office in May 2008, the Executive Yuan recommended its
abolition. In January 2009, the legislature took the dramatic step
of repealing the Liumang Act in its entirety. The Court’s
repeated, careful review of the Liumang Act was vital to pushing
the legislature into action.
II. STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
To understand the important role of the three relevant
constitutional interpretations in the demise of the Liumang Act,
it is first necessary to take a step back and explain the structure
of constitutional review in Taiwan.
The Constitutional Court is the final arbiter in questions
that require interpretation of the ROC Constitution (
) and
is further charged with unifying the interpretation of laws.18
Unlike ordinary judges in Taiwan, who have lifetime
appointments subject to limited exceptions,19 a Justice on the
Court is limited to an eight-year term. The shift from lifetime to
16. J.Y. Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), translated at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=384.
17. J.Y. Interpretation No. 523 (Const. Ct. Mar. 22, 2001), translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=523 .
18. Although not of importance in the liumang context, the Constitutional Court
also holds the power to dissolve political parties that are deemed in violation of the
Constitution. See Sifa Yuan Da Faguan Shenli Anjian Fa (
)
[Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law] arts. 19–33 (promulgated Sept. 15,
1948, amended Feb. 3, 1993) (Taiwan) [hereinafter CIPL], translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=73.
19. See MINGUO XIANFA art. 78 (1947) (Taiwan). Article 81 of the Constitution
provides for lifetime tenure except if the judge has been found guilty of a criminal
offense, subjected to disciplinary action, or declared to be under interdiction. See id.
art. 81.

872 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:863
eight-year terms—and a reduction in the number of Justices
from seventeen to fifteen—occurred in 2003. 20 In order to
facilitate this transition and create a staggered appointment
system, eight of the fifteen Justices were appointed to four-year
terms in 2003, with the other seven serving eight-year terms. A
Justice’s term may not be renewed. Nevertheless, because of the
newness of the eight-year term system, it remains to be seen
whether the Additional Articles of the Constitution will be
interpreted to allow a Justice to be reappointed a few years after
stepping down from the bench. If a future president decides to
nominate a person who has previously served as a Justice, it
could result in a protracted battle because the nominee not only
would need to pass through the mud-wrestling politics of the
Legislative Yuan but also would need an interpretation from the
Court holding that the Additional Articles of the Constitution
allow for such a reappointment.
Justices are drawn from five categories: (1) Supreme Court
judges; (2) members of the Legislative Yuan; (3) distinguished
professors; (4) judges from international courts or other public
or comparative law specialists; and (5) people who are highly
reputed in the legal field and have political experience. 21
According to the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan (
), no more than one-third of the Justices shall qualify under
any single one of these five categories.22 Yet, an early study notes
that the Constitutional Court is dominated by academics and
career judges.23 As of 2005, the Court was composed of seven

20. Despite not taking effect until 2003, these changes were adopted in 2000 as
part of revisions to the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC. See
) [Additional
ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN (
Articles of the Constitution of the ROC] art. 5, translated at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
news/additional.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2014). The Additional Articles were last
amended in 2005.
21. See Sifa Yuan Zuzhi Fa (
) [Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan] art.
4, §1 (promulgated Mar. 31, 1947, amended Jan. 21, 2009) (Taiwan), translated at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p07_2asp?lawno=81 These general
categories only set forth the minimal qualifications. For example, not every Supreme
Court judge is qualified to serve on the Constitutional Court: the judge must have
served on the Supreme Court for more than ten years and have a distinguished record
during that time of service. Id.
22. See id. § 2.
23. See Thomas Weishing Huang, Judicial Activism in the Transitional Polity: The
Council of Grand Justices in Taiwan, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 8 (2005) (“Despite
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Justices from the judiciary, seven from academia, and one from
government.24 Notably, twelve of these Justices were educated
abroad as well as at home.25 It is unclear how the Taiwanese
government reconciled this composition with the statutory onethird rule. Roughly half of the Justices’ terms expired at the end
of 2007. By March 2008, there were only eleven sitting Justices;
the four vacancies resulted from a failure of the KMT-controlled
Legislative Yuan to approve the nominees of then President
Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party. These
vacancies were filled after Ma Ying-jeou assumed office and, by
May 2009, the Court was back up to its full bench of fifteen and
remained at fifteen as of April 2014.26
Petitions for constitutional interpretations reach the Court
through several channels, many of the details of which are set
forth in the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law (
)27 and its Implementing Rules (
). 28 Central and local government
agencies may file a request when they are uncertain about how
the Constitution pertains to the exercise of their powers or when
they are uncertain about the constitutionality of a particular law
or order that affects their work. For example, government
agencies may apply when there is a dispute among them about
the meaning of the Constitution. Natural persons, legal persons,
and political parties may also apply for constitutional
interpretations when they believe that their constitutional rights
have been infringed. In this case, there is a requirement that all
other judicial remedies be exhausted before the request is filed,
and the request must be directed at the constitutionality of the
law or order that was applied by the court of last resort.29 When
the guidelines for selecting Justices, the statistics show that the Constitutional Court has
been dominated by academics and professional judicial careerists.”).
24. See id.
25. See id. (explaining that statistics “show that Justices have overwhelmingly been
educated abroad, particularly in Germany, Austria, and the United States”).
26 . See Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan-Justices, http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p01_03.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2014).
27. This law is more directly translated as the “Law Governing the Hearing of
Cases by the Grand Justices, Judicial Yuan,” but we use the generally accepted
translation in this study.
28. CIPL, supra note 18, art. 5.
29. At the time of writing, the Judicial Yuan had approved—but the legislature
had failed to pass—revisions to the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law that
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reviewing petitions filed by natural or legal persons, the
Constitutional Court does not decide individual cases as does
the US Supreme Court. Rather, it examines the constitutionality
of a law or order divorced from the concrete case that gave rise
to the request for an interpretation. Accordingly, in
Interpretation No. 636, there is no mention of the particular
facts of the liumang cases that prompted the petitions. Members
of the Legislative Yuan may also request an interpretation when
they are uncertain either as to the application of the
Constitution itself or the constitutionality of a particular law. In
this situation, at least one-third of the members of the
Legislative Yuan must agree to the petition’s filing.
Finally, with respect to judges, in 1995 the Constitutional
Court held in Interpretation No. 371 that a judge may suspend
proceedings sua sponte (i.e., by the judge’s own volition) and
apply for a constitutional interpretation when the judge believes
that a statute or regulation that is before the court is
unconstitutional. 30 Indeed, the first time a judge used this
procedure was to question the constitutionality of the Liumang
Act, and this same procedure was used in the petitions that led
to Interpretation No. 636. Interestingly, this judge-initiated
procedure is the only means of filing a petition that is not
provided for in the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure
Law.
Turning to the substance of the petition, the Constitutional
Interpretation Procedure Law provides that a petition must
include the following components: (1) purpose of the petition;
(2) issues and facts, and the related constitutional provisions;
(3) grounds for the petition, position adopted by the petitioner,
and arguments; and (4) list of exhibits attached.31 These general
would introduce a number of procedural changes, including that citizens would no
longer have to exhaust all channels for relief. See Press Release, Judicial Yuan, Sifa Yuan
Yuanhui Tongguo Sifa Yuan Da Faguan Shenli Anjian Fa Xiuzheng Cao’an (
) [Judicial Yuan Approves Draft Revisions to
the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law] (2013), available at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p10_02.asp?id=109037.
30 . J.Y. Interpretation No. 371, 7 SHIZI 26 (Const. Ct. Jan. 20 1995). The
Constitutional Court’s decision to allow judges in all lower courts to adjourn
proceedings and refer constitutional questions to the court was significant in that it
indirectly broadened citizens’ access to obtain constitutional interpretations early in
the litigation process.
31. CIPL, supra note 18, art. 8.
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requirements are clarified on the Judicial Yuan’s website, along
with clerical issues such as the size of paper that petitioners must
use.
The first step when the petition comes in the door is for a
panel of three Justices to review it, determine whether the
petition meets the above procedural requirements, and, if the
requirements are met, pass it along to the full Constitutional
Court for further discussion.32 If the petition is denied by the
full court after review by the three-Justice group, the Court will
issue a “decision not to accept the petition” (
).
Neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Interpretation
Procedure Law expressly authorizes the Constitutional Court to
pick and choose cases based on their perceived importance. In
practice, we were told that the Court sometimes rejects petitions
if the Justices think that they have no constitutional
importance.33 To avoid criticism, the Court might not clearly
state the reason for rejection and instead note that the petition
fails to state which provisions of the law in question violate
specific constitutional articles or that the petition simply does
not raise constitutional issues. For example, in April 2014, the
Court rejected the applications of three death row inmates who
claimed that the death penalty is unconstitutional.34 Although
the stated reason was that the applicants did not specify why the
death penalty violated the ROC Constitution, it is unclear to
what extent this procedural explanation was also a convenient
way to avoid addressing controversial issues. In rejecting the
applications, the Court acknowledged there are questions
regarding both the constitutionality of the death penalty as well
32. See id. art. 10. From conversations with people familiar with the workings of
the Constitutional Court, we were told that the fifteen Justices are divided into five
subgroups, and petitions are assigned by rotation.
33 . In writing this Article and the related book, we relied on Taiwan’s
conventional laws, rules and regulations, judicial decisions and other government
publications, scholarly writings, newspaper and magazine articles, conversations with
judges, prosecutors, lawyers, police, and scholars; as well as visits to government
agencies, police stations, and even the institutions for punishing liumang. Names have
been redacted from all conversations, as was promised to the people with whom we
spoke.
34. See, e.g., Wang Wenling, 3 Si Fan Shenqing Shi Xian Quan Shu Bei Bohui (3
[3 Death Penalty Petitions Dismissed in Full], UDN.COM (Apr. 18,
2014, 8:24 PM), http://udn.com/NEWS/BREAKINGNEWS/BREAKINGNEWS2/
8621632.shtml.
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as whether it violates international human rights norms that
have been incorporated into Taiwan’s domestic law. The Court
may also delay acceptance for long periods, as was seen in the
case of the petitions addressed in Interpretation No. 636.
Constitutional Court decisions, which are consecutively
numbered, are made publicly available and are conveniently
posted on the Judicial Yuan’s website.35 For example, in Decision
No. 1269, issued on July 30, 2005, the Court announced its
decision to reject thirty-seven petitions, one of which addressed
the Liumang Act. In a few paragraphs, the Decision describes
the petition and the reasons why the Court rejected it. The
petitioner had been committed to reformatory training by the
public security tribunal of the Taipei District Court, and the
public security tribunal of the Taiwan High Court had rejected
his appeal. The Constitutional Court denied his challenge to the
constitutionality of several provisions in the Liumang Act and its
Implementing Rules (
) because the
petition failed to meet the requirements of the Constitutional
Interpretation Procedure Law; namely, the public security
tribunal did not rely upon the challenged provisions in the
Liumang Act when making its decision.36 Albeit cold comfort for
the petitioner, the decision was at least helpful to future
petitioners in that it provided guidance regarding arguments
that the Court found inadequate.
The rejected petitioner in the above example is far from
being in the minority. The Court accepts only a tiny percentage
of petitions for constitutional interpretations. As reported in an
introductory brochure issued by the Court, from July 1, 1948, to
September 30, 2003, the Court received 7640 petitions and
issued only 566 decisions. Among the 7640 petitions filed, 815
(10.67%) were filed by governmental agencies, whereas 6825
were filed by individuals (89.33%). The pattern of only
accepting a small number of cases has continued in recent years.
Since 1998, the number of interpretations announced in any
one year has ranged from a high of twenty-eight in 1998 to a low
of 13 in 2007. According to the Judicial Yearbook, in 2007, the
Court dismissed 348 cases and issued interpretations in only 13,
35 . Interpretations, JUSTICES CONST. CT., JUD.
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03.asp.
36. CIPL, supra note 18, art. 5, § 1.

YUAN,

R.O.C.,

http://
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with 176 cases listed as pending.37 In 2009, the Court dismissed
412 cases and issued interpretations in only 16, with 246 cases
listed as pending.38
If a petition is among the rare few that are accepted, the
Justices will proceed to analyze the merits and select a Justice to
draft an opinion, which the designated Justice will circulate
among all the Justices for discussion prior to voting.39 Standard
practice is for Justices to meet three times per week, with extra
sessions held “when necessary.” 40 Oral arguments giving
petitioners and others an opportunity to be heard in person are
seldom convened, though the Court may call for them “when
necessary.”41 There is no elaboration regarding what this vague
“when necessary” provision actually means in practice. When
one of the authors of this Article visited the Constitutional
Court’s elegant courtroom, the judge showing it joked that this
was probably one of the few times that the room’s lights were
turned on that year—an exaggeration, but there was more truth
than jest in his observation. Our research team was pleasantly
surprised when the Court convened a hearing to discuss the
petitions that led to Interpretation No. 636 and called on one of
our Taiwanese research colleagues to appear as an expert.
Once the draft opinion is ready for a vote to adopt an
interpretation regarding the constitutionality of a statute, twothirds of the Justices must be present to constitute a quorum,
and the agreement of two-thirds of those Justices present is
required. The two-thirds quorum requirement is the same for an
interpretation when a government order is at issue, but the
agreement of only a majority of those Justices present is
required.42 The author of the majority opinion is not disclosed,
though Justices may issue individual concurring and dissenting
opinions, which can be quite colorful and impassioned. The
majority opinion itself is composed of the “holding” of the
interpretation and a separate “reasoning” section that, true to

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38.
Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38.
CIPL, supra note 18, art. 11.
Id. art. 15.
Id. art. 13.
Id. art. 14.
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its name, details the bases for the Constitutional Court’s
holding.43
The Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Law provides
that the interpretation may instruct relevant agencies of the
need to execute the interpretation and, further, determine the
types and means of execution so required. 44 This general
provision is the basis for the Constitutional Court’s power to go
beyond a mere declaration that a law is unconstitutional and
actually order other government bodies to take action. As an
alternative to telling other government bodies the means by
which the interpretation shall be executed, the Court may
simply declare a law, regulation, or order null and void and
leave the other bodies to decide what action to take. A modified
approach sometimes preferred by the Court is to declare that
the law, regulation, or order will become null and void after a
specified period, as was used by the Court in the three
interpretations regarding the Liumang Act. The next Part turns
to the Court’s specific involvement in scrutinizing the
constitutionality of the Act and, ultimately, prompting the other
branches of government to repeal it.
III. INITIAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN CURBING POLICE
POWER
Although individual liumang decisions by the police
formally became subject to court review as early as 1985, the
special “public security tribunals” (
) within the district
courts provided little check, both because of daunting
procedural barriers to mounting a defense and the courts’
general pro-KMT/police propensity.45 Revisions to the Liumang
Act in 1992 failed to change this review from cursory to
substantive. It was only when the Constitutional Court stepped
in that real change began to occur.
The Constitutional Court first addressed the Liumang Act
in 1995. In Interpretation No. 384, the Court declared that five
43. Id. art. 17, § 1.
44. Id. § 2.
45. See Wang, supra note 12, at 554 (“In the context of authoritarian rule, the
KMT judicial authorities usually paid limited attention to the dignity or human rights
of the accused.”).
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articles of the Liumang Act were unconstitutional.46 First and
foremost, the Court held that Articles 6 and 7, which
empowered the police to force people to appear without any
judicial approval, violated the right to physical freedom of the
person (
), as provided in Article 8 of the Constitution.
Article 8 requires that, except in the case where a person is
discovered while committing a crime or immediately thereafter
(i.e., in flagrante delicto), no person shall be arrested or detained
other than by judicial or police agencies in accordance with
“procedures prescribed by law.” The Court further emphasized
that any law used to deprive people of their physical freedom
must be proper in substance (
) and comply
with Article 23 of the Constitution, which provides that
freedoms and rights enumerated in the Constitution shall not
be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent
infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an
imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public
welfare. After stating these constitutional bases, the Court held
Articles 6 and 7 of the Liumang Act unconstitutional because, as
then written, they authorized the police to force people to
appear before them without following any judicial procedures.
In accordance with this Interpretation, the legislature revised
the articles that addressed the police’s authority to force
suspected liumang to appear for questioning. The revised
articles required that police first obtain judicial approval or,
when exigent circumstances required immediate action, that
there be prompt judicial review after the fact.
Second, the Constitutional Court held in Interpretation
No. 384 that the secret witness system as then set forth in Article
12 of the Liumang Act deprived the accused of the right to
defend oneself and hampered the truth-finding function of the
Court. Despite this holding, the resulting revisions that allow for
secrecy only “when necessary” did little in reality to increase the
transparency of the witness system.
Third, the Court struck down the practice of requiring
people to serve time in prison followed by time in reformatory
training, or vice versa, for the same act. The Justices began by
46. J.Y. Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), translated at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=384.
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noting that, as then written, Article 21 of the Liumang Act
allowed the imposition of reformatory training after execution
of a criminal punishment for the same act, without regard to
whether there was a special preventive necessity to do so. This
practice, the Justices explained, could result in the loss of bodily
freedom (
).
The legislature revised Article 21 to provide that, if the
liumang behavior for which the accused was committed to
reformatory training was also the basis for criminal punishment,
time spent serving the criminal punishment and time spent in
reformatory training would be mutually set-off (
) on a
one-day-for-one-day basis. Finally, the legislature expanded the
relief channels available to liumang in response to the Court’s
holding that Article 5 failed to protect the constitutional right to
lodge administrative appeals and institute administrative
litigation.47
Notably, shortly before issuance of Interpretation No. 384,
the Law for the Punishment of Police Offenses passed into
history. And, once again, the Court played a key role in the
process. In 1990, the Court declared that certain provisions of
that law would cease to be effective on May 1, 1991, because
those provisions violated the Constitution’s protection of
physical freedom. In response, the legislature replaced the
offending law with a new Social Order Maintenance Law that
addresses mild disruptions of social order and is still in use
today.48 This law covers a wide array of offenses ranging from
illegally using another person’s identifying documents, to
maltreating animals, to willfully picking another person’s flowers
or other vegetation.49
The maximum punishment under the Social Order
Maintenance Law is detention (
) of up to five days.
Significantly, the courts—not the police—have the power to
impose this punishment. The law specifies clear judicial
decision-making procedures. Aside from enumerated minor
violations for which detention is never allowed, if the police,
47. MINGUO XIANFA art. 16 (1947) (Taiwan).
48. Shehui Zhixu Weihu Fa (
) [Social Order Maintenance Law]
(June 29, 1991) (Taiwan), translated at http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/
LawContent.aspx?PCODE=D0080067.
49. See id. arts. 66, 79, 88.
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following investigation, believe detention is necessary, they must
transfer the case to the district court for a ruling by the summary
division, in which single judges decide cases based on the files
and without requiring a hearing. If the court orders detention
and, without a valid reason, the violator does not appear after
receiving notice, only then can the police force the person to
appear. The law further includes a chapter on “Relief” (
)
for people who wish to challenge their punishment. In 2009,
6690 new social order maintenance cases were filed with the
district courts, representing a noticeable decrease from the 8754
cases filed in 1998.50 Of the 6294 cases closed in 2009, 2028
people were sentenced to detention. Of those people, 1569 were
sentenced to one day and only one person was sentenced to over
three days.51
Interpretation No. 523, issued in 2001, precipitated more
modest reforms to the Liumang Act than its predecessor. This
time, the Justices held that the procedures used for confining
suspected liumang under Article 11 of the Liumang Act violated
Articles 8 and 23 of the Constitution:
This confinement . . . is a serious restraint on people’s
physical freedom. Nevertheless, the Act does not explicitly
provide the conditions upon which a court may base its
imposition of confinement . . . . The Act grants the court
discretion to decide the accused’s confinement without
regard for whether he is continuing to seriously breach
social order, or if he will obstruct the court’s hearing of the
case by fleeing, destroying evidence, or threatening
informants, victims, or witnesses.52

The Constitutional Court held that the offending
provisions would become null and void one year from the date
of the Interpretation. Within that year, in 2002, the legislature
revised Article 11 by including specific criteria for determining
whether confinement was required and by adding two new
articles (Articles 11-1 and 11-2) that detailed procedures for
canceling (
), stopping (
), and repeating (
)
confinement.
50. Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38, tbl. 71.
51. Judicial Statistics Yearbook, supra note 38, tbl. 72.
52. J.Y. Interpretation No. 523 (Const. Ct. Mar. 22, 2001), translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=523.s
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Several years passed with no action from the Constitutional
Court, despite reported calls for further judicial review.53 Then,
on January 28, 2005, Judge Guo Shu-hao, a public security
tribunal judge from the Taichung District Court, applied for an
interpretation (the “Taichung Petition”). 54 Judge Guo
suspended proceedings in a liumang case pending before him
because of doubts about the constitutionality of the Liumang
Act. In December 2005, a similar petition was submitted by a
second public security tribunal judge, Judge Qian Jian-rong of
the Taoyuan District Court (the “Taoyuan Petition”).55 Nearly
two years of silence followed. Eventually, in the autumn of 2007,
the Constitutional Court convened a hearing to address the
issues raised in these two petitions. Interpretation No. 636
followed on February 1, 2008. The detailed legal arguments
behind this final and most important interpretation are taken
up in the next Part.
IV. INTERPRETATION NO. 636
In the Taichung Petition, Judge Guo presented a targeted
challenge to the definition of “liumang,” arguing that several of
the enumerated categories of liumang behavior violated the
constitutional principle of legal clarity (
).
Although Judge Qian, in the Taoyuan Petition, also raised this
argument, he mounted a more sweeping attack on the Liumang
Act, ranging from the constitutionality of the secret witness
system to the practice of imposing both reformatory training
and criminal punishments for the same act. The main
constitutional arguments raised in the petitions are discussed
below, along with the Court’s responses thereto.

53. The influential Judicial Reform Foundation (
) formed a
group to study the Liumang Act. The group suspended its efforts, however, after its
petitions failed. Further Constitutional Court interpretations supported by the group
and other efforts to repeal the Liumang Act were similarly unsuccessful.
54. Guo Shu-hao, Petition for J.Y. Interpretation (filed with Const. Ct. Jan. 28,
2005) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Guo Shu-hao petition].
55. Qian Jian-rong, Petition for J.Y. Interpretation (filed with Const. Ct. Dec. 16,
2005) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Qian Jian-rong petition].
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A. Definition of Liumang and the Principle of Legal Clarity
The
two
petitions
vigorously
challenged
the
constitutionality of the statutory definition of liumang. In the
Taichung Petition (the narrower of the two), Judge Guo focused
on two categories in the definition and argued that the
descriptions therein violated the constitutional principle of legal
clarity. Sections 3 and 5 of Article 2, as then written, listed the
following types of liumang behavior:
3) People who occupy territory; commit blackmail and
extortion; force business transactions; eat and drink without
paying; coerce and cause trouble; tyrannize good and
honest people; or manipulate matters behind the scenes to
accomplish the foregoing.
. . .
5) People who are habitually morally corrupt or who
habitually wander and act like rascals and the facts are
sufficient to believe that they have undermined social order
or endangered the life, body, freedom, or property of
others.

Judge Guo honed in on the following four types of behavior,
though his petition indicated that other parts of the definition
possibly also failed to pass constitutional muster: coercing and
causing trouble (
); tyrannizing good and honest
people (
); being morally corrupt (
); and
wandering and acting like rascals (
). According to
Judge Guo, it violated the right to physical freedom, as provided
for in Article 8 of the Constitution, to incarcerate people based
on these descriptions. 56 Quoting the Constitutional Court’s
holding in Interpretation No. 384, Judge Guo contended that
these sections failed to satisfy the requirement that any law used
to deprive people of their physical freedom must be proper in
substance. Moreover, he asserted that the provisions failed to
comply with Article 23 of the Constitution, which provides that
freedoms and rights enumerated in the Constitution shall not
56. As previously discussed, Article 8 of the Constitution provides, in part, that
“physical freedom shall be guaranteed to the people. In no case except that of flagrante
delicto, which shall be separately prescribed by law, shall any person be arrested or
detained other than by a judicial or police organ in accordance with procedures
prescribed by law.” MINGUO XIANFA art. 8 (1947) (Taiwan).
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be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent
infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an
imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or to advance public
welfare.
Judge Guo explained that one aspect of laws being proper
in substance is the principle of nulla poena sine lege (
), namely, the principle that there be no punishment without
a law authorizing it. This requirement is a basic component of
what is broadly known as the principle of legality—the
foundational principle that laws be clear and ascertainable. In
the criminal context, this requires that people be able to
determine what acts are being criminalized.57 Otherwise, the law
does not serve as an effective guide and people are left without
understandable rules to which they can conform. The
Constitutional Court explicitly addressed the principle of
legality in Interpretation No. 384, in which it wrote that
“substantive due process of law covers both substantive law and
procedural law and, for substantive law, it must comply with the
principle of nulla poena sine lege.” 58 Likewise, as part of the
Taoyuan Petition’s more broad-based attack on the Liumang Act,
Judge Qian contended that the definition of liumang violated
“the principle of nulla poena sine lege” (
) and “the
principle of clarity of crimes and punishments” (
).59
57. As described by one American scholar:
The most fundamental tenet of criminal law is the principle of legality, which
today means that criminal liability and punishment can only be predicated on
a prior legislative enactment that states what is proscribed as an offense in a
precise and clear manner. This is a concept that is reliant on various
doctrines, most significantly the “void for vagueness” doctrine and the
doctrine of “strict construction.”
John. F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American
Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 241, 244–45 (2002).
58. J.Y. Interpretation No. 384, 7 SHIZI 226 (Const. Ct. July 28, 1995), translated at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=384.
59. Judge Qian wrote that “the principle of clarity of crimes and punishments” is
an important component of nulla poena sine lege (
). Exact phrasing aside, this is a “void for vagueness” argument. In the same
section of his petition, Judge Qian further raised the principle of equality (
),
namely that people should be treated equally under the law and they should not be
subject to unreasonable disparities in treatment (
,
). Yet, the fact that there was great disparity in the application of the Liumang Act
appears to be more a result of the vagueness problem than a separate ground on which
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Although not apparent in the text of the Liumang Act, the
principle of legal clarity—specifically nulla poena sine lege—is
explicitly provided for in the Criminal Code. Article 1 provides
that, to be punishable, behavior must be clearly stipulated as
punishable by law at the time of the act. This provision, however,
is of no concrete guidance in the liumang context because the
Criminal Code is freestanding. A challenge to the liumang
definition thus had to be rooted directly in the text of the
Constitution. The problem is that it is less than clear as to how
“clear” a law must be to satisfy constitutional concerns. The very
contours of the principle of legal clarity are hard to pin down.
To give shape to this abstract principle, Professor Jaw-perng
Wang of National Taiwan University School of Law advocated
looking outside Taiwan. In commentary on the constitutionality
of the Liumang Act that Professor Wang gave at an academic
conference and later submitted to the Constitutional Court,60 he
explained that the principle of clarity for criminal laws (
) is equivalent to the US constitutional principle of “void
for vagueness.”61 Professor Wang cited the writings of a US legal
to challenge the Act. Judge Qian introduced various aspects of inequality that were
raised by the Liumang Act’s application. First, for people who committed a criminal act
and who were also determined to be liumang—as compared with pure criminal
defendants (i.e., those not simultaneously targeted as liumang)—there was an
unreasonable disparity in treatment. Second, within the realm of liumang, various
categories of people (i.e., as described by Judge Qian, warned liumang, serious
liumang, recidivist liumang after a warning, recidivist liumang after reformatory
training, and serious liumang who are caught in the act) received significantly different
treatment, and it was difficult to articulate the criteria for making the distinctions. Qian
Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 11. That similarly, or in some cases identically,
situated people were in jeopardy of being subject to unequal treatment was vividly
demonstrated by a case in which a district-court public security tribunal judge ruled
that two people who bird-napped pigeons were not serious liumang. On appeal, one
panel took the position that the accused was a serious liumang, and the other ruled
that the behavior did not have the requisite characteristic of being an offensive
violation. The exact same factual scenario thus led to two contrasting outcomes.
60 . Jaw-perng Wang, Professor, National Taiwan University School of Law,
Speaker at the National Taiwan University School of Law’s Conference: “Taiwan’s
System for Dealing with Liumang: Constitutionality, Criminal Justice, and Broader
Implications” (Dec. 14, 2006). Prof. Wang’s address was later published in 2008. In
November 2007, Professor Wang was asked by the Constitutional Court to present his
views on whether the Liumang Act was constitutional.
61. See Wang, supra note 60, at 9; see also Jaw-perng Wang, Yige Tiaoli, Bachu
Weixian: Lun Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli (
—
) [The
Liumang Act: One Law, Eight Unconstitutional Aspects], 155 YUETAN FAXUE ZAZHI [TAIWAN
L. REV.] 121 (2008).
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scholar, John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., in explaining the principle’s
theoretical underpinnings. 62 Jeffries draws upon three
intertwined doctrines. First is the principle of legality, which
“stands for the desirability in principle of advance legislative
specification of criminal misconduct.” 63 Simply put, the
principle condemns judicial crime creation.64 Second, Jeffries
addresses the vagueness doctrine, which he describes as “the
operational arm of legality”: “It requires that advance, ordinarily
legislative crime definition be meaningfully precise—or at least
that it not be meaninglessly indefinite.”65 The third doctrine,
the rule of strict construction, provides that criminal statutes be
strictly construed against the state.66 Jeffries describes this rule as
“[t]he second doctrine said to implement the ideal of legality.”67
Professor Wang centered his argument on the vagueness
doctrine, as did Judges Guo and Qian. In view of the extremely
mushy wording of the contested provisions in the liumang
definition, it is hard to see how the rule of strict construction
would be of any help. The definition is not merely ambiguous,
rather it is hopelessly vague68 How can one strictly construe the
phrase “wandering and acting like rascals”?69

62. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
Va. L. Rev. 189 (1985).
63. Id. at 190.
64. Id. at 189.
65. Id. at 196 (citations omitted).
66. This rule that ambiguity in a criminal law be resolved against the government
and to the advantage of the accused is also known as the “rule of lenity.”
67. Jeffries, supra note 62, at 198.
68. In his article, Professor Decker, explains: “A relative of vagueness, ambiguity
appears where otherwise understandable legislation lends itself to two or more equally
plausible interpretations.” Decker, supra note 57, at 243. Despite being two distinct
concepts, it is not always clear when legislation tips from being ambiguous to vague, or
vice versa: “at what point is it permissible to conclude the legislation contains sufficient
specificity that it can be described as ambiguous rather than vague?” Id.
69. Neither Judges Qian nor Guo pursued what would be called an “overbreadth
argument” in American jurisprudence:
If a party challenges an enactment based on the assertion that one cannot
determine whether the regulation intrudes upon otherwise “innocent
terrain” then the complaint is one of vagueness. On the other hand, if a
challenge is based on an objection that the regulation does, in fact, intrude
into territory where it does not belong, then the claim is one of overbreadth.
Id. at 266. For example, neither judge contended that the Liumang Act could be used
against people who were staging peaceful demonstrations outside Taiwan’s Presidential
Palace, a not infrequent occurrence.
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In his commentary, Professor Wang explored three reasons
raised by Jeffries as to why an unclear provision in the criminal
law should be void for vagueness. 70 First, a vague provision
violates the separation of powers principle. In those
circumstances, the legislature has essentially abandoned its
responsibility to define crimes, leaving the courts to take the
legislature’s rightful place.71 In liumang cases, the courts were
left to flesh out abstract phrases, such as “habitually morally
corrupt,” with no legislative guidance. The overarching
legislative requirement that the conduct in question be
“sufficient to have undermined social order” raised similar
concerns because it forced judges into the shoes of legislators.
The Implementing Rules’ further paltry guidance that conduct
be “unspecific” (
), an “offensive violation” (
),
and “habitual” (
) was of little, if any, help.72
Second, a vague provision violates the doctrine of notice
because the government fails to give people fair notice of what
constitutes criminal behavior. As explained by the US Supreme
Court, “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.” 73 Did the
Liumang Act give fair warning as to when a person’s behavior
crossed the line between being merely unsociable and rude and
instead being downright unlawful? Could a person of common
intelligence determine at what point he transformed himself
from a contemptible but legal louse to a liumang?
In the Taichung Petition, Judge Guo asserted that people
were unable to predict when the Liumang Act would apply to
their conduct because of the lack of clarity in the definition of
liumang. Judge Guo pointed out that, not only were the
aforementioned types of liumang behavior unclear, but also
there were no supplemental criteria that made them more
70. See Wang, supra note 61, at 11.
71. See Jeffries, supra note 62, at 202.
72. Jiansu Liumang Tiaoli Shixing Xize (
) [Implementing
Rules for the Act for Eliminating Liumang], art. 4 (promulgated Nov. 27, 1985)
(Taiwan).
73. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citations
omitted).
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concrete. While acknowledging that absolute clarity is
impossible, Judge Qian emphasized the need for people to be
able to predict what conduct the law proscribes and argued that,
as such, the individual requirements of a crime’s components
must be concretely described. Like Judge Guo, he attacked the
definition of liumang because it failed to provide the necessary
guidance for people to understand what exactly was proscribed.
The Implementing Rules’ listing of three characteristics of
behavior “sufficient to have undermined social order” was
stunningly unhelpful in providing concrete guidance both to
individuals who might be deemed liumang and, as explained
further in the following paragraph, to judges who needed to
interpret the law. Indeed, both petitions were written by public
security tribunal judges whose jobs were to apply the abstract
criteria to specific cases on a daily basis. No one was better
suited to give a candid appraisal of how the liumang criteria
worked in practice, or did not work, as the case appeared to be.
Third, unclear criminal laws are unable to control the
indiscriminate exercise of power by the authorities because
there is no ascertainable standard of guilt. In other words, there
is a threat of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because
people enforcing the law can essentially base decisions on
personal preferences.74 Of course, a modicum of discretion is
unavoidable, and often desirable, in any criminal justice system.
The question is when discretion tips from being a positive force
into one that creates an enforcement free-for-all. Professor
Wang contended that this third rationale was the strongest basis
for the Constitutional Court to hold that certain provisions in
the liumang definition were unconstitutionally vague. 75 In
particular, he argued that the following proscribed behaviors
listed in Article 2(3) and (5) were unconstitutional because
people enforcing the law ended up doing so in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner: occupying territory (
); eating
and drinking without paying (
); tyrannizing good and
honest people (
); being morally corrupt (
);
and wandering and acting like rascals (
).76

74. See Jeffries, supra note 62, at 212.
75. See Wang, supra note 60, at 12.
76. See id. at 12.

2014]REINING IN POLICE POWER: TAIWAN AND THE PRC 889
As Judge Qian pointed out, there were problems with the
inherent lack of clarity in the criteria upon which police
identified warned liumang and serious liumang. 77 Even if a
person satisfied the general liumang definition, the Liumang
Act added another layer of complexity by separating liumang
into two categories. Those in the first, milder category, received
sanctions limited to a warning (
) and a one-year “guidance”
period—a period of police-administered supervision resembling
probation.78 The term “guidance” (
) is a bit of an Orwellian
euphemism because during the one-year period the emphasis
was more on observing the person’s behavior rather than
counseling him to reform. These “warned liumang” (
—literally “liumang warned and under guidance”)79 did not
see the inside of a courtroom, except in the rare event that one
eventually challenged the determination of his status in
administrative court. In contrast, a person alleged to be in the
second category, a “serious liumang” (
—literally
“liumang for whom the circumstances are serious”), was
brought before a public security tribunal, and this tribunal
decided whether the person would undergo reformatory
training. The average man on the street would likely have no
idea that such a distinction existed. The difference in terms of
the procedures and sanctions applied to these two separate
varieties of liumang was, however, substantial.
In addition, there was a concern that police in different
areas of Taiwan took divergent views regarding what qualified as
“serious” behavior, as compared with behavior that only
warranted “warned” liumang status.80 Because the less you see
something the stranger it is, police in areas with fewer liumang
were said to be more likely to pursue someone as a serious
liumang than in areas where liumang were more prevalent. For
example, consider a case where the police determined that
77. See id. at 13.
78. The criminal law allows for probation for certain offenders. See ZHONGHUA
MINGUO XINGFA [Criminal Code] arts. 92–93 (amended June 11, 2013) (Taiwan).
79. The phrase “liumang warned and under guidance” is used interchangeably
with “liumang listed in the register and under guidance.” This register was maintained
by the police and contained the names of all liumang currently under guidance.
Warned liumang were also colloquially referred to as “ordinary liumang,” a term that
was used by several interviewees who took part in this study.
80. See Wang, supra note 60, at 11.
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someone was a liumang on the basis that he was “eating and
drinking without paying” because he ate and drank, refused to
pay, and even threatened a bar owner who requested payment.
What if the alleged liumang had paid his bills and never
threatened the bar owner directly, but the rest of his behavior
remained the same? Or if this same person was unemployed and
spending his days loafing around in bars, frequenting gambling
dens, and behaving aggressively toward people. Was his behavior
“morally corrupt,” or merely “morally astray” without rising to
the level of being liumang behavior? Could the authorities have
found that he was coercing and causing trouble; tyrannizing
good and honest people; being morally corrupt; or wandering
and acting like a rascal? The police and judges were left to make
this judgment with extremely limited guidance. It is this specter
of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that had Professor
Wang and Judges Guo and Qian concerned.
This argument regarding the lack of legal clarity in the
definition of liumang partly won over the Constitutional Court.
In Interpretation No. 636, the Justices parsed the definition of
liumang and declared the following two clauses unconstitutional
because they violated the principle of legal clarity: the act of
“tyrannizing good and honest people” (Article 2(3)) and
“people who are habitually morally corrupt or who habitually
wander and act like rascals” (Article 2(5)). The Court further
held that the acts of “occupying territory,” “eating and drinking
without paying,” and “coercing and causing trouble” were
constitutional but problematic, and the Court thus called on
relevant authorities to evaluate the possibility of concretely
describing these acts. The Justices addressed several other
aspects of the definition and found no constitutional
problems.81 The Court’s decision to pluck out discrete offending

81. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 holding, para. 1 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1,
2008), translated at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?
expno=636. (“The provision of Article 2, Section 3, of the [Liumang Act] regarding the
acts of ‘committing blackmail and extortion, forcing business transactions, and
manipulating matters behind the scenes to accomplish the foregoing’; the provision of
Section 4 of the same Article regarding the acts of ‘managing or controlling
professional gambling establishments, establishing brothels without authorization,
inducing or forcing decent women to work as prostitutes, working as bodyguards for
gambling establishments or brothels, or relying on superior force to demand debt
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provisions and leave the definition of liumang largely
unchanged was consistent with its prior measured approach
when reviewing the constitutionality of the Liumang Act.
An attack on the substantive definition of liumang was but
one of several challenges to the Liumang Act. The following
Sections address criticisms that were aimed at various procedural
aspects of the Act. When analyzing the various challenges, it is
important to bear in mind the fundamental bifurcated scheme
that distinguished warned liumang from serious liumang. The
comparatively severe ramifications of being classified as a serious
liumang were underscored by Judges Guo’s and Qian’s
challenges to the Liumang Act, which overwhelmingly focused
on serious liumang.
B. Power of the Police to Force Suspected Liumang to Appear
In the Taoyuan Petition, Judge Qian looked again to Article
8 of the Constitution, this time to challenge the police’s ability
to force people to appear, as provided for in Articles 6, 7, 9, 10,
and 11 of the Liumang Act. Prior to Interpretation No. 384,
Article 6 of the Liumang Act provided that, if a person was
found to be a liumang and the circumstances were serious, the
police had the power to summon the person without prior
warning and, if the summoned person did not comply, to force
him to appear at the police station. Article 7 similarly provided
that, if a person reengaged in liumang behavior within a year
after a determination that he was a liumang, the police had the
power to summon him; and, if the summoned person did not
comply, the police could force him to appear at the station. For
people caught while engaging in liumang behavior, the police
could take them directly into custody without any prior
summons. In Interpretation No. 384, the Constitutional Court
concluded that the Liumang Act’s failure to differentiate
between people caught in the act and people apprehended at a
later time violated Article 8 of the Constitution, which clearly
distinguishes between the two situations and prescribes different
procedures. As a result of this Interpretation, the legislature
revised the Liumang Act to require that police first obtain
repayment’; and the provision of Article 6, Paragraph 1, regarding ‘“serious
circumstances”’ do not violate the principle of legal clarity.”).
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judicial approval or, when exigent circumstances required
immediate action, that there be prompt judicial review after the
fact. Judge Qian contended that these revisions did not go far
enough.
Judge Qian argued that the procedures and criteria in the
Liumang Act were constitutionally lacking when viewed against
the procedures for arrests under exigent circumstances in the
Criminal Procedure Code. For example, he pointed to the
comparatively “strict reasons and requirements” for emergency
arrests (
) in Article 88-1 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 82 which in part permits emergency arrests when the
person is a potential flight risk, provided that the alleged offense
is punishable with the death penalty, life imprisonment, or a
minimum prison sentence of not less than five years.83 Here,
“emergency arrest” means an arrest made by the police
unilaterally under exigent circumstances. The Liumang Act did
not have an equivalent restriction and, indeed, the punishment
for liumang could never reach five years because reformatory
training was statutorily capped at three.
Judge Qian further pointed to the differences between the
procedures for arresting a person caught in the act of
committing liumang behavior (
) and a person caught in
the act of committing a crime (
).84 Under the Criminal
Procedure Code, an emergency arrest is subject to immediate
review by a prosecutor.85 The Liumang Act, in contrast, skipped
prosecutorial review and the case proceeded to the court
directly, which Judge Qian argued was insufficient as compared
82. Although Judge Qian used the term “emergency arrest” (‘
’) in the
Taoyuan Petition, Article 88-1 uses slightly different terminology, namely “discretionary
arrest” (‘
’). In general, the Criminal Procedure Code uses different terms for
arrest with a warrant (‘
’) and without a warrant (‘
’). In practice, “arrest
without a warrant” means arrest under exigent circumstance, such as when a person is
caught in the act. Neither a “discretionary arrest” nor an “arrest without a warrant”
requires a warrant at the time that the person is physically taken into custody. They are
different, however, in that after a “discretionary arrest,” the police must obtain a
warrant (issued by a prosecutor, not a judge) or the arrestee must be released. In
contrast, after a straightforward “arrest without a warrant,” the police need not obtain a
warrant and may simply send the arrestee to the prosecutor.
83. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 15.
84. XINGSHI SUSONG FA [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 92 (promulgated July 28,
1928, amended June 23, 2010) (Taiwan); see also Act for Eliminating Liumang, supra
note 6, art. 10.
85. XINGSHI SUSONG FA [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 92.
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with the advanced review provided to criminal suspects. These
and other examples raised by Judge Qian highlight aspects
where the Criminal Procedure Code provides different, and
convincingly more stringent, limitations on the police’s ability to
arrest suspects. In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional
Court agreed, to a certain extent, that the Liumang Act’s
procedural requirements were not only less stringent, but also
unconstitutional.
The Court began the reasoning section of Interpretation
No. 636 by emphasizing the fundamental right to physical
freedom that is contained in Article 8 of the Constitution. The
Court went on to quote Article 6 of the Liumang Act regarding
arrests without warrants, but did so to announce only that the
phrase “circumstances are serious” did not contradict the
principle of legal clarity. 86 Interpretation No. 636 failed to
address squarely the issue of arrests under exigent
circumstances. That being said, the Court did declare that
procedures for transferring an accused liumang to court against
his will were unconstitutional. 87 The Court added that
procedures for requiring warned liumang to appear if they
86. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 reasoning, paras. 6–9 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1,
2008).
When a person is determined to be a [liumang] and the circumstances are
serious, the police precinct of the directly governed municipality or police
department of the county (city), with the consent of the directly supervising
police authorities, may summon the person to appear for questioning without
prior warning. If the summoned person does not appear after receiving
lawful notice and does not have proper grounds for failing to appear, then
the police may apply to the court for an arrest warrant. However, if the facts
are sufficient to lead the police to believe that the person is a flight risk and
there are exigent circumstances, then the police may arrest him without a
warrant . . . So-called ‘serious circumstances’ shall be determined according
to the common societal conception of this provision and shall take into
consideration the means used to carry out the act, the number of victims, the
degree of harm, and the degree to which social order was undermined when
examining the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
circumstances are serious. This provision does not contradict the principle of
legal clarity.
Id.
87. Act for Eliminating Liumang, supra note 6, art. 9 (“If a person voluntarily
appears before and is questioned by the police but does not wish to be transferred to
the court, the police may not compel him to be transferred to the court. Doing
otherwise would violate due process of law.”); J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1
reasoning, para. 9 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1, 2008).
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committed another liumang act should be interpreted in the
same manner.88 The Court dismissed other challenges to Articles
9, 10, and 11 on procedural as well as substantive grounds.89
Formal constitutional arguments aside, we see no
compelling reason why the procedures for summons and
transfers in liumang cases should have been different from, and
indeed less protective than, those in criminal cases. Nor could
we find any persuasive, or even cogent, evidence that liumang
suspects were inherently more dangerous or flight-prone than
criminal suspects. Moreover, in view of the huge overlap
between criminal and liumang cases, it would have made
practical sense to have consistent procedures: the police were
likely to summon a suspect for both purposes. The legislature’s
decision to repeal the Liumang Act thus strikes us as infinitely
reasonable from a procedural standpoint.
C. Right to Be Heard by the Review Committee
A second procedural challenge addressed in Interpretation
No. 636 was the right of accused liumang to be heard by the
review committee, which held the power to declare a suspect to
be a warned liumang or transfer the suspect to the court for a
determination whether he was a serious liumang. At the time of
Interpretation No. 636, accused liumang had no opportunity to
participate in this determination process, with the first

88. Act for Eliminating Liumang, supra note 6, art. .
89. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1 reasoning, para. 15 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1,
2008).
As for the petitioners’ position that the constitutionality of the provisions of
Article 2, Paragraph 1, and Articles 10, 14, and 15 of the Act are in doubt,
they are not the legal provisions that the judge in the case at hand shall apply.
The constitutionality of these provisions does not influence the results of the
court’s ruling. In addition, the petitioners allege that the constitutionality of
Article 2, Section 2; the proviso of Article 6, Paragraph 1; the proviso of
Article 7, Paragraph 1; and Articles 9, 11, 22, and 23 are in doubt, and further
question the constitutionality of the Act as a whole. The grounds raised by the
petitioners in support of the unconstitutionality of the foregoing provisions
are insufficient to constitute concrete reasons for an objective belief that the
statute is unconstitutional. These two parts of the petition do not meet the
requirements set forth in this Council’s Interpretations Nos. 371 and 572 and
are therefore dismissed.
Id.
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indication that they were even under suspicion usually coming
in the form of official notice of the committee’s decision.
For the first time, in Interpretation No. 636, the
Constitutional Court declared that an accused liumang was
entitled to a voice before the review committee. The Court
noted that the diverse membership of the review committee—
including police, prosecutors, legal specialists, and impartial
people from society—was conducive to promoting objective
decision-making. Nonetheless, in order to comply with the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law, “the accused
must have the right to be heard during the proceedings, in
addition to the right to receive relief after receiving an
unfavorable decision.”90 This newly articulated right was never
implemented because of the decision to repeal the Liumang
Act, but we nonetheless applaud this belated recognition that
accused liumang should have been allowed some form of earlier
participation in the committee’s proceedings.
D. Serious Liumang: Procedures at the District Court Level
Challenges to procedural aspects of the Liumang Act were
not limited to the stages when the case was in the hands of the
police. Judge Qian and other critics raised weighty concerns
regarding the constitutionality of procedures used once cases
reached the district courts for handling by public security
tribunals. Concerns were focused on the use of a secret witness
system, the lack of prosecutorial involvement, and the denial of
a public hearing.
1. The Secret Witness System and the Right to Confront and
Examine Witnesses
The Constitutional Court dealt an initial blow to the secret
witness system in Interpretation No. 384, in which it held that
the unfettered use of secret witnesses, as then allowed by Article
12 of the Liumang Act, deprived the accused of the right to
defend himself and hampered the truth-finding function of the
court. However, the resulting revisions that allowed for secrecy
only “when necessary” did little to increase the transparency of
90. See id. para. 8.
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the witness system because in practice secrecy was deemed
necessary almost without exception. This raised the question
whether the system of using secret witnesses “when necessary”
passed constitutional muster in view of the reality that the
exception of secrecy had swallowed the general rule of
transparency and confrontation. Judge Qian answered “no” and,
in Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court agreed.
In the Taoyuan Petition, Judge Qian also contended that,
even as revised, Article 12 of the Liumang Act deprived the
accused of his right to confront and examine witnesses in
violation of the right to physical freedom as it relates to the
principle of “proper legal procedures” (
),
which is commonly translated as “due process.” Here, again,
Article 8 of the Constitution was the primary constitutional basis,
though the argument also rested on the right to institute legal
proceedings in Article 16. For concrete support, Judge Qian
looked to Interpretation No. 582,91 issued in 2004, in which the
Court addressed whether out of court statements made by a
criminal co-defendant against another co-defendant should be
admissible in court. Prior to Interpretation No. 582 and the
adoption of hearsay rules in the Criminal Procedure Code, all
out-of-court statements by one co-defendant were admissible
against another co-defendant, regardless of the context. In
Interpretation No. 582, the Court began its holding by stating
that Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees people the right
to institute legal proceedings (
). As far as a criminal
defendant is concerned, this guarantee includes the right to
defend oneself adequately in a legal proceeding. Crucial to
Judge Qian’s argument was the court’s statement that a criminal
defendant’s right to examine a witness is a corollary of the right
to defend oneself and is also protected by the principle of due
process.
Judge Qian argued that the Court’s reasoning in
Interpretation No. 582 should be extended to accused liumang.
He posited that legislation can “restrict,” but not “deprive”
people of, the right to confront witnesses because a deprivation
violates the proportionality principle (
)—the principle
91. See J.Y Interpretation No. 582, 17 SHIZI 519 (Const. Ct. July 23, 2004),
translated at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=582.
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that measures must be reasonable, the least restrictive possible,
and not excessive.92 Judge Qian continued that Article 12 of the
Liumang Act crossed the line between a constitutionally
allowable restriction and a flat-out deprivation because it
allowed judges to “refuse” an accused liumang’s request to
confront and examine witnesses.
The stark deprivation of an opportunity to confront
witnesses in liumang cases stands in contrast to Taiwan’s more
creative Witness Protection Law (
), 93 which
emphasizes the use of voice alteration and other protective
measures as alternatives to cutting off all questioning of the
witness by the accused. Judge Qian thus continued that while a
criminal defendant may have had access to an adverse witness
under the Witness Protection Law, in a companion liumang
case, the witness suddenly underwent a “metamorphosis” and
became a secret, unavailable witness. Not only did this
difference in treatment of criminal defendants and accused
liumang violate the principle of equality (
) according
to Judge Qian, the use of secret witnesses in liumang cases was
even more pernicious because it acted as a tool for people (and,
most alarming, police) who harbored grudges and sought
retaliation.
The Constitutional Court agreed that the secret witness
system was constitutionally deficient. Specifically, the Justices
explained in Interpretation No. 636 that Article 12 of the
Liumang Act restricted the accused’s rights to confront and
examine witnesses and to access court files without requiring the
tribunal to take into consideration whether, in view of the
individual circumstances of the case, other less intrusive
measures were sufficient to protect the witness’s safety and the
voluntariness of his testimony. For instance, the Court cited the
92. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 18. The Constitutional Court stated
in Interpretation No. 471 that this principle is enshrined in Article 23 of the
Constitution, which provides that freedoms and rights enumerated in the Constitution
shall not be restricted by law except as may be necessary to prevent infringement upon
the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order, or
to advance public welfare. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Dec.
18, 1998).
93. Zhengren Baohu Fa (
) [Witness Protection Law] (promulgated
May 30, 2006) (Taiwan), translated at http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/Law
Content.aspx?PCODE=A0030161.
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use of masks, voice alteration, and other protective measures as
possible alternatives. The Court held that Article 12 was clearly
an excessive restriction on the accused’s right to defend himself
in a legal action and was inconsistent with the principle of
proportionality. The Court further held that procedures violated
the principle of due process of law under Article 8 of the
Constitution and the right to institute legal proceedings under
Article 16 of the Constitution. The secret witness provision as
then written in the Act was to be null and void one year from the
Interpretation’s date of issuance.
The Legislative Yuan, in response, could have adopted a
modified “when necessary” formulation. In Interpretation No.
636, the Constitutional Court qualified its critique of the secret
witness system by stating that to protect witnesses from
endangering their lives, bodies, freedom, or property as a result
of being confronted and examined, the rights of the accused
and his lawyer may be restricted by concrete and clear statutory
provisions that comply with the principle of proportionality
under Article 23 of the Constitution. The decision to repeal the
Liumang Act rendered this issue moot. Today, the primary law
regulating access to witnesses in criminal cases remains the
Witness Protection Law. As noted above, the Court went further
in Interpretation No. 636 than only addressing confrontation of
live witnesses: the Court also held that the Liumang Act
unconstitutionally restricted the accused’s access to court files.
Professor Wang, who appeared in front of the
Constitutional Court to address the merits of the two judicial
petitions, extended his critique to notification procedures. He
contended that the procedures used to notify accused serious
liumang that they were so accused violated the right to defend
oneself. When the police transferred a liumang case to the
public security tribunal pursuant to Article 9 of the Liumang
Act, they were required to notify the accused liumang and his
designated friends or relatives of this action. The police,
however, were not required to provide the accused liumang with
a copy of the transfer document (
). In a criminal case,
the indictment (the equivalent to the transfer document in a
liumang case) must be given to the defendant and must contain
the items listed in Article 264 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
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including descriptions of the facts and evidence alleged.94 The
indictment is required to list the allegations so that the
defendant can defend himself in a meaningful way. Professor
Wang argued that accused serious liumang were not given this
same opportunity, and there was no legitimate reason for
treating them differently from criminal suspects.
The Constitutional Court did not address notification
procedures in Interpretation No. 636, but we agree with
Professor Wang that the difference in treatment between
criminal and liumang suspects rose to the level of
unconstitutional treatment. Put simply, failure to notify the
accused in advance of the details on which charges are based
denies him an adequate opportunity to answer the charges.
This right is enshrined in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which provides that
everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be entitled “[t]o
be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against
him.”95 The punishment dispensed to those determined to be
serious liumang was the substantive equivalent of criminal
punishment, so this right should have been applicable to those
accused of being serious liumang.
In 2009, following the repeal of the Liumang Act, Taiwan
ratified and incorporated into its domestic legal system the
ICCPR, along with the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 96 In 2013 ten independent
international human-rights experts were invited to Taiwan to
review its implementation of the two human rights covenants in
accordance with the practice of the United Nations.97 Had the
94. See Wang, supra note 61, at 16.
95. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, § 3, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
96. See Ko Shu-Ling, Legislature Ratifies UN Rights Treaties, TAIPEI TIMES, Apr. 1,
2009, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/01/2003439900.
97 . Following the review, the experts released “Concluding Observations and
Recommendations,” pointing out government practice inconsistent with the protections
under the two human rights covenants. See REVIEW OF THE INITIAL REPORTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS COVENANTS: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY
THE INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, INT’L COV. ON CIV. & POL.
RIGHTS (2013) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE INITIAL REPORTS], available at http://
www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/33516305719.pdf. For the review
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Liumang Act survived, some of its remaining provisions may not
have passed the scrutiny under the ICCPR.
2. Lack of Prosecutorial Involvement
Witnesses were seldom seen in the courtroom during
liumang cases, but prosecutors were never present. Judge Qian
asserted that the Liumang Act violated the principles of the
separation of prosecution and adjudication (
) and the division of powers and functions (
)
because no prosecutor was involved in the proceedings. Since
prosecutors did not appear, this forced judges into roles unlike
those seen in criminal cases. In criminal proceedings, after the
initial police investigation, the prosecutors take a lead role with
the police being subject to their direction. The prosecutor
makes the crucial decision whether to prosecute. In liumang
cases, the police made the decision whether to recommend that
the accused be sent to confinement, with the only prosecutorial
involvement being that a lone prosecutor sat on the review
committee. No prosecutor took part in the judicial hearing, and
lawyers only appeared in a minority of cases. Nor were the police
a “party” in liumang court hearings. The law did not require
that police attend the hearing and, in practice, the police did
not fulfill the prosecutorial role in court. Clearly, the
involvement of a prosecutor would have heightened professional
and public confidence in the fairness and accuracy of the
liumang adjudication system, but did the Constitution require
it?
We stop short of Judge Qian’s position that the absence of
prosecutors during the actual court hearing was
unconstitutional under either principles of the separation of
prosecution and adjudication or the division of powers and
functions. In liumang cases, the judge at least had the transfer
document, which was prepared by the executive branch. The
hearing itself closely resembled prior inquisitorial practices but

process, see Yu-Jie Chen & Jerome Cohen, Forging Ahead, S. MORNING CHINA POST,
Mar. 29, 2013; Yu-Jie Chen, A New Tool for Promoting Human Rights in Taiwan, CHINA
POL’Y INST. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2013), http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicy
institute/2013/03/24/a-new-tool-for-promoting-human-rights-in-taiwan/.

2014]REINING IN POLICE POWER: TAIWAN AND THE PRC 901
this alone is not sufficient to hold the related provisions of the
Liumang Act unconstitutional.
We do agree with Judge Qian that procedures under the
Liumang Act did not comport with the spirit of recent reforms
to Taiwan’s Criminal Procedure Code. Specifically, Judge Qian
targeted Articles 22 and 23 of the Liumang Act, which addressed
the composition and functions of the public security tribunal, as
well as Articles 18 to 24 of the Implementing Rules, which
elaborated the relevant provisions of the Liumang Act. We agree
that he rightly questioned the wisdom of the public security
tribunals’ inquisitorial method, specifically the practice of
having public security tribunal judges play the dual role of
questioning accused liumang and then deciding whether
confinement was warranted. This practice stood in stark contrast
to the modified adversarial system used for criminal proceedings
today. The practice of having a judge serve in effect as both
prosecutor and sole adjudicator in the courtroom before
sentencing someone to three years in conditions that were
virtually identical to a prison was arguably inconsistent with
contemporary standards of due process in Taiwan. Procedures
that may be permissible before merely imposing a fine or a short
stay in a detention cell take on a different gloss when applied to
a significant prison sentence. We will never hear the Justices’
official views on this issue because the Constitutional Court
declined to address the relevant articles of the Liumang Act on
procedural grounds.
3. Lack of Public Hearings
Another issue that is absent from Interpretation No. 636 is
Professor Wang’s critique regarding the constitutionality of
barring the public from the courtroom. Although the
Constitutional Court did not address this argument in
Interpretation No. 636, we believe that it deserves consideration.
In his argument to the Court, Professor Wang maintained
that the Constitution requires public hearings before the public
security tribunals on the district court level. The system under
the Liumang Act involved only the judge, the accused liumang,
and sometimes his lawyer and witnesses, even if the accused
liumang did not get to see and question them. It was a closed
trial. Although Taiwan’s Constitution does not expressly grant
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people the right to “a speedy and public trial,” as the Sixth
Amendment to the US Constitution does, 98 Professor Wang
explained the bases for this right in Article 16 of the ROC
Constitution (the right to institute legal proceedings), and
Article 8 (the right to physical freedom).99 For support, Wang
looked to Justice Wu Geng’s concurring opinion in
Interpretation No. 368, in which he stated that the right to
institute legal proceedings (
) in Article 16 includes the
right to a public hearing.100 As a caveat, Interpretation No. 368
did not address a liumang case, but Professor Wang proposed
that the reasoning be extended to the liumang context. The
Constitutional Court later flatly stated in the reasoning section
of Interpretation No. 482 that the right to institute legal
proceedings includes a public hearing, though this also was not
in the context of a liumang case.101
In the context of liumang cases, however, the Court had
interpreted Article 8 of the Constitution to require due process
and, in Interpretation No. 384, the Court noted that this
encompassed the principle that trial proceedings should be
open to the public. Therefore, Professor Wang explained,
whether Article 8 or Article 16 was used as a basis, accused
liumang should have a constitutional right to a public hearing.
Due to the seriousness of the consequent punishment involved,
we support this view. Moreover, as previously noted, the ICCPR
requires that state parties afford people charged with crimes a
“fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”102
98. In 2010, Taiwan passed a Speedy Trial Act (
). Although this
Act is a step forward in decreasing the time that a case can be pending, as noted by the
independent experts reviewing Taiwan’s implementation of the ICCPR, it still fails to
meet international standards. See REVIEW OF THE INITIAL REPORTS, supra note 97
(“Article 5 of the Speedy Trial Act 2010 further stipulates a maximum period of eight
years of pre-trial detention, which, in the opinion of the Experts, violates the
‘reasonable time’ limit of Article 9(3) ICCPR.”).
99. See Wang, supra note 61, at 13.
100. The majority opinion did not address this point, but it did note that the right
to institute legal proceedings in Article 16 of the Constitution means that people have
the right to demand through legal procedures a judicial remedy for the final
disposition of disputes over jural relations.
101. J.Y. Interpretation No. 482 (Const. Ct. Apr. 30, 1999), translated at http://
www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=482.
102. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966
999 U.N.T.S. 171. The ICCPR provides for an exception in limited cases: “The press
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E. Serious Liumang: Punishment by Reformatory Training
Critics of the Liumang Act forcefully criticized the manner
in which serious liumang were punished. Challenges to the
reformatory training system focused on the use of indeterminate
sentences and the method of setting off time spent in
reformatory training and serving criminal punishments.
1. Indeterminate Sentences to Reformatory Training
Under Article 13 of the Liumang Act, the public security
tribunal had the authority to decide whether or not to impose
reformatory training, but the tribunal did not decide the actual
length of the sentence. Article 19 provided the standard
duration: reformatory training was set at between one and three
years with the possibility of release after one year, provided that
the original ruling court agreed. In Judge Qian’s view, a public
security tribunal’s ruling to commit a person to reformatory
training violated the principle of clarity (
) because the
tribunal failed to state a definite sentence within the one- to
three-year window.103 In other words, Judge Qian asserted that
the indeterminate sentence left the liumang agitated and in fear
all day.104 This, he argued, was constitutionally unacceptable.
For support, Judge Qian relied on Interpretation No.
471, 105 in which the Constitutional Court struck down a
mandatory provision in the Firearms Act (
) that required three years of forced work (
)
106
when a person was convicted of specified offenses, without
considering the necessity of the three-year sentence in view of
and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public
order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest
of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice” Id. art. 14 § 1. Similarly, the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan
provides that court hearings shall be open to the public, see Sifa Yuan Zuzhi Fa (
) [Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan] art. 86 (promulgated Mar. 31, 1947,
amended Jan. 21, 2009) (Taiwan), though Taiwanese law allows limited exceptions,
such as for trials involving juveniles, see Shaonian Anjian Chuli Fa (
)
[Juvenile Proceedings Act], art. 34 (promulgated May 18, 2005) (Taiwan).
103. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 20.
104. Id.
105. J.Y. Interpretation No. 471, 10 SHIZI 456 (Const. Ct. Dec. 18, 1998), translated
at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=471.
106. The article at issue, Article 19, has since been repealed.
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the defendant’s particular situation. The Court explained that
the failure to consider individual circumstances violated the
proportionality principle. 107 The Court held that judges may
sentence people to three years of forced work but are not
required to do so. The Court did not directly address
indeterminate sentences in Interpretation No. 471. Judge Qian
contended that the reasoning of this Interpretation should be
extended to reformatory training and, accordingly, judges
should be required to mete out definite sentences in liumang
cases based on individual circumstances. Judge Qian further
questioned the constitutionality of having the actual length of a
liumang’s reformatory training decided by the administrative
agencies that supervised the training. He argued that this
practice violated the institutional protections of the
constitutional right to institute legal proceedings and also
violated the separation of powers principle.108
Although Judge Qian threw a number of weighty
constitutional principles at the practice of indeterminate
sentencing under the Liumang Act, the Constitutional Court did
not address them in Interpretation No. 636. Unlike the
mandatory three-year-sentence provision that the Court held
unconstitutional in Interpretation No. 471, the revised Liumang
Act allowed for release from reformatory training after one year,
subject to certain conditions. Nor did Judge Qian provide clear
support for his position that it was unconstitutional for
administrative agencies to recommend early release. Moreover,
Judge Qian’s argument did not address the separation of powers
among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches. Based on
Taiwan’s current governmental structure, the determination of
how much of their sentences prisoners should serve and which
institution should decide when prisoners can be released in
individual cases should be left to the legislature and the
executive, respectively. That said, those determinations should
be made under sufficient constraints such that there is not
unfettered discretion. For example, the parole provision in the
Criminal Code provides that, subject to certain limitations,
parole (
) is available for criminal offenders after they have
107. MINGUO XIANFA art. 23. (1947) (Taiwan).
108. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 21.
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served half of their term of imprisonment, or twenty-five years of
a life sentence.109
2. Setting Off Reformatory Training and Criminal Punishments
Prior to Interpretation No. 384, Article 21 of the Liumang
Act allowed the imposition of reformatory training either before
or after execution of a criminal punishment for the same act,
without regard to whether there was a special preventive
necessity to do so. In Interpretation No. 384, the Constitutional
Court held that this practice violated the constitutional
guarantee of physical freedom, and it gave the legislature until
the end of 1996 to fix the problem. Article 21 of the revised
Liumang Act provided that, if the liumang behavior for which
the accused was committed to reformatory training was also the
basis for criminal punishment,110 time spent serving the criminal
punishment and time spent in reformatory training would be
mutually set off on a one-day-for-one-day basis. Judge Qian
argued that this legislative fix did not solve the constitutional
problem. In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court
agreed, to a limited extent. In order to alleviate concerns that
the physical freedom of a person subject to both criminal
punishment and reformatory training might be excessively
deprived, the Court called on relevant authorities to re-examine
and revise the phrasing in the Liumang Act.
As background, in Interpretation No. 384, the Court
explained that one aspect of due process is that people not be
punished for the same act twice. Thereafter, in Interpretation
No. 604, the Court clarified that multiple punishments may be
imposed for multiple violations and this does not give rise to any
issue of double punishment. Judge Qian did not contest this
position. Instead, he contended that the “setting off” system had
other flaws. Most notably, if a person was imprisoned for one
year and then, for the same conduct, began reformatory training
upon release from prison, he would still have one to two years
left after the one-year deduction. For people sentenced to both
109. ZHONGHUA MINGUO XINGFA [Criminal Code] art. 77 (amended June 11,
2013) (Taiwan).
110. Specifically, time spent serving a fixed-term imprisonment (
),
detention (
) (as punishment, as compared with pre-trial detention (
)), and
rehabilitation measures (
) was set off from reformatory training.
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prison and reformatory training, only those who were sentenced
to three or more years in prison thus avoided having to undergo
reformatory training. As a result, a liumang might as well have
committed an act that landed him in prison for three years
rather than a lesser offense that would have resulted, for
example, in two years of prison and one year of reformatory
training.
To highlight the confusion over this practice, Judge Qian
raised an example from the 2003 Legal Symposium of the High
Court of Taiwan and its Subsidiary Courts. Judges discussed the
following scenario at the symposium: if reformatory training and
a ten-month prison sentence were proposed for the same act
and the prison sentence was finalized first, what should the
courts do? One position was that the prison sentence should
commence and be completed first, based on the “first finalized,
first enforced” principle. Another view was that the person
should not be sent to prison but only to reformatory training
because, as a result of the short length of the prison sentence, to
first send the person to prison would effectively result in double
punishment (i.e., ten months in prison followed by a minimum
of one year in reformatory training). The very purpose of setting
off sentences was to avoid such scenarios. Despite the logical
force of the second viewpoint, the discussion ended with a
decision to side with the first position—“first finalized, first
enforced”—regardless of the length of the criminal sentence,
highlighting that illogical is not the same as unconstitutional.
Under the Liumang Act, reformatory training could last up
to three years. If a person served a ten-month prison sentence
and then began reformatory training, the total time behind bars
thus would exceed the three-year maximum only if he spent
more than two years and two months in reformatory training.
Nonetheless, we agree with Judge Qian’s position that this would
always constitute “double punishment” no matter how long the
duration of reformatory training, and surely anyone whose
reformatory training was about to exceed two years and two
months, having served ten months in prison for the same act,
would have had an even stronger claim for legal relief. That dual
imposition of reformatory training and prison time constituted
“double punishment” is buttressed by the reality that the two
reformatory training facilities also housed regular convicts
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under the same roof, albeit in separate areas of the facilities, and
that both types of inmates often shared the same training
classes. When a person finished his criminal sentence, he may
have just moved to a different cell in the same facility to begin
his liumang sentence. In other words, the naked eye could not
discern a qualitative difference in the nature of the criminal and
liumang punishments. The difference between prison and
reformatory training was thus quite blurred.
In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court quoted
Article 19 of the Liumang Act, which provided in part:
The term of reformatory training is set at more than one
year and less than three years. After completion of one year,
if the executing authorities believe that it is unnecessary to
continue reformatory training, they may report, with facts
and evidence, to the original ruling court for its permission
and exempt the person from further reformatory training.

The Court pointed out that when criminal punishment or
rehabilitation measures were first carried out for more than
three years, there was no need to then commence reformatory
training because of the mutual set-off provision. In other words,
the punishment for the corresponding criminal case already
exceeded the maximum allowable sentence to reformatory
training. Accordingly, this situation did not raise doubts
regarding excessive restrictions on people’s physical freedom.
The Justices therefore focused their attention on the
situation when criminal punishment or rehabilitation measures
were first carried out for less than three years. Because public
security tribunals did not sentence liumang to a fixed term of
reformatory training, a liumang could serve anywhere between
the statutory minimum and maximum (i.e., one to three years)
and that determination was made based on the liumang’s
progress at the training institute. As a result, the exact amount
of time that the liumang should serve in reformatory training
following completion of criminal punishment or rehabilitation
measures was unclear. For example, if a person already served
two years in prison, did he then still have to complete the
minimum one year in reformatory training for a total time
behind bars of three years? Alternatively, could the training
institute personnel agree to release him immediately because he
had already spent more than the minimum one-year term
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behind bars? If the Liumang Act was interpreted as meaning
that reformatory training should be enforced for a minimum of
one year beyond the criminal sentence, the Court cautioned
that the physical freedom of the person subject to reformatory
training might be excessively restricted. In Interpretation No.
636, the Court commanded the relevant authorities to reexamine and revise the Liumang Act to alleviate this concern.
In a partial concurring opinion, three Justices faulted the
majority for not addressing whether the Liumang Act violated
the principle of ne bis in idem, which translates from Latin as
“not twice for the same,” and means that no legal action can be
instituted twice for the same cause of action.111 Namely, this
concern arose because of the substantial overlap between
offenses in the Criminal Code (and specialized criminal laws)
and liumang acts, an issue also raised by Professor Wang. It was
standard practice for suspected liumang to face concurrent
criminal charges stemming from the same acts. The concern
that people were thus being tried in court twice for the same
underlying acts was very real even though the Constitutional
Court failed to address this issue head-on in Interpretation No.
636.

111. According to Judge Qian’s view, the principle that people not be punished
for the same act twice is also called “the principle of the prohibition against double
jeopardy” (
). This statement is misleading because the two concepts
are not necessarily coextensive. This highlights a vexing problem in comparative law
terminology and translations. Some of Taiwan’s terminology comes from Germany,
some from Germany via Japan, some from the United States, and still other
terminology is unique to China/Taiwan. The principle of ne bis in idem is varyingly
translated in Taiwan as “do not punish the same behavior twice” (
), “do
not punish the same act twice” (
), “do not punish the same act again” (
), “prohibition against repeat punishments” (
), and “prohibition
against double punishments” (
). In Interpretation No. 604, the majority
opinion used “do not punish the same behavior twice” (
), but concurring
and dissenting opinions by justices in this same interpretation used other formulations.
Judge Qian also argued that the Liumang Act violated the principle that the “same
matter not be tried twice” (
) because the criminal and liumang cases arising
from a single act were tried before different courts in different proceedings. In
addition to constitutional concerns, Judge Qian argued that this practice wasted
judicial resources and was unnecessary, a critique shared by judges whom we
interviewed.
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F. The Liumang Act as a Second Criminal Procedure Code
The most fundamental question according to Judge Qian
was whether Taiwan needed to have a “second Criminal
Procedure Code” that resulted in the accused being subject to
two proceedings and the concomitant waste of judicial
resources. This, however, is a policy argument more properly
directed at the Legislative Yuan. As expected, the Constitutional
Court declined to address this issue.
The argument that the concurrent use of the liumang and
criminal justice systems squandered resources may not be a
constitutional one, but it is a compelling one. Judge Qian
argued that the Liumang Act, in its entirety, contradicted the
proportionality principle because there were alternative means
to obtain the same legislative purposes as the Liumang Act but
with less harm.112 Judge Qian raised this paramount question in
the final pages of the Taoyuan Petition. He asserted that there
were still a number of unconstitutional provisions, singling out
the secret witness system as a particularly egregious
constitutional violation. Put simply, he drew the Constitutional
Court’s attention to how glaringly antiquated the Liumang Act
had become. Like Judge Qian, over the course of our research
we recognized the Liumang Act’s historical role in combating
the criminal underworld, yet we seriously questioned the
continuing need for it under Taiwan’s present day legal system.
Thankfully, the executive and legislative branches finally
conceded that the time to retire the Liumang Act had arrived.
V. FROM INTERPRETATION NO. 636 TO REPEAL
In Interpretation No. 636, the Constitutional Court gave
the Legislative Yuan one year to fix the constitutional infirmities
in the Liumang Act, or the offending provisions would become
null and void. 113 The countdown to February 1, 2009, had
begun.
112. For support, Judge Qian invoked Interpretation No. 544, in which the
Justices cited the availability of other alternative means to attain the same purposes with
less harm as a component of whether a law is consistent with the proportionality
principle. Qian Jian-rong petition, supra note 55, at 31.
113. J.Y. Interpretation No. 636, 21 SHIZI 1, Reasoning, para. 14 (Const. Ct. Feb. 1,
2008).
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Based on experience with the first two constitutional
interpretations that addressed the Liumang Act, conventional
wisdom expected that the legislature would once again revise
the Act in a piecemeal fashion in order to meet only the
minimal requirements laid down by the Constitutional Court. As
the year wore on, it also looked increasingly likely that those
revisions would come at the final hour, as was done with
previous amendments. Although the Legislative Yuan had always
held the power to abolish the Liumang Act, that scenario was
deemed unlikely, both because the Court had called for only
limited revisions and because there is no political capital to be
gained by looking soft on crime, in Taiwan or elsewhere.
Prospects for repeal were further dampened in light of the
insistence on keeping the Liumang Act even after the Court
declared part of the Act unconstitutional in 1995 and 2001.
Following these earlier interpretations, the legislature
emphasized that the Act was an efficient weapon to crack down
on crime (
.
Adding another obstacle to reform, whether well-founded
or not, police and other officials with whom we spoke repeatedly
stated that the common people supported the Liumang Act
because they were afraid of liumang. This is not to say that all
police were against revising the Liumang Act. A National Police
Agency official told us that he supported revisions done through
the people’s representatives in order to improve the Act. This
same official emphasized that people need to consider the
victim’s perspective because there are times when the criminal
law alone is insufficient. For example, what if upon leaving a
restaurant you find a man standing next to your car who politely

Id.

In light of the fact that amending the law requires a certain period of time—
and so that the relevant authorities can conduct a comprehensive analysis of
the Act by taking into consideration both the need to protect people’s rights
and the need to maintain social order—those parts of the following
provisions that are inconsistent with relevant principles of the Constitution
shall become null and void no later than one year from the date of this
Interpretation: Article 2, Section 3, regarding the act of ‘“tyrannizing good
and honest people,”’ Section 5 of the same Article regarding ‘“people who
are habitually morally corrupt or who habitually wander around and act like
rascals,”’ and Article 12, Paragraph 1, which excessively restricts the
transferred person’s right to confront and examine witnesses and to access
court files.
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tells you that he has watched your car so that it would not be
stolen, and shouldn’t you give him a little money to buy
something to drink? The threat is implicit but easily understood.
Opponents of the Liumang Act countered that the Criminal
Code is sufficient to deal with these kinds of situations, such as
through Article 304, which covers crimes of coercion (
).
There is also the Social Order Maintenance Law, which
authorizes detention (
) for up to five days for various types
of injurious conduct.114 A person may, for instance, be punished
by such detention for using another person’s identifying
documents or for deceiving by carrying a toy gun that looks like
a real gun and thereby endangering safety.115
Then, in the autumn of 2008, the new administration of
President Ma Ying-jeou unexpectedly broke the political
stalemate. On November 17, 2008, the Executive Yuan
submitted a proposal to the Legislative Yuan for abolition of the
Liumang Act. In the proposal, the Executive Yuan set forth five
reasons in support of its position. First, as pointed out in the
concurring opinion to Interpretation No. 636, even if the
legislature revised the Act, there would still be lingering
questions regarding the constitutionality of reformatory
training. The Executive Yuan even borrowed the language in the
concurring opinion when arguing that it was difficult to make
the Liumang Act compatible with the Constitution no matter
how it was revised.
Second, the Executive Yuan argued that the legal nature of
the Act was unclear because it contained components of both
administrative law and criminal law. The Executive Yuan bluntly
asked whether provisions in the Act actually belonged to
administrative law or criminal law, and it further pointed out
that the unclear nature of the Act made it difficult to protect the
rights and interests of the accused.
Third, the overlap between the Liumang Act and criminal
laws resulted in needless duplication. This point clearly echoed
the arguments raised by Judge Qian regarding the necessity and
wisdom of perpetuating the liumang system.
114. ZHONGHUA MINGUO XINGFA [Criminal Code] art. 19 (amended June 11,
2013) (Taiwan).
115. Id. arts. 66 § 2, 65 § 3.
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Fourth, enforcement of the amended Act would have
created
administrative
difficulties;
after
noting
the
Constitutional Court’s holding that an accused liumang had a
right to be heard during the proceedings before the review
committee, the Executive Yuan advised that this would impose a
further burden on the committee’s work.
Finally, the Executive Yuan urged that times had changed
and, not only was the Act no longer necessary, it was contrary to
Taiwan’s increasing embrace of human rights. The Executive
Yuan briefly traced the Act’s history since 1955 and concluded
that criminal laws and the Social Order Maintenance Law were
sufficient for society’s current needs. To underscore this point,
the Executive Yuan attached an appendix with a table setting
forth the different types of liumang behavior and how criminal
laws and the Social Order Maintenance Law could be used to
address the same behavior.
Legislative debate ensued in December 2008, and
representatives of the Executive Yuan, Judicial Yuan, and
National Police Agency testified before the Legislative Yuan.
Legislators raised concerns that criminal laws alone would be
insufficient to protect the public and further inquired about the
impact of releasing incarcerated liumang. One legislator
estimated that, of twenty-three county and city police
departments, sixteen supported repeal—to which the National
Police Agency representative replied that left seven police
departments which supported only revising the Act.116
The majority police support for abolishing the Act might
seem odd at first glance, given that the Act provided police with
an additional tool to remove troublemakers from the street. We
can only speculate because the legislative record does not clarify
why the vast majority of police departments reportedly
supported repeal. Perhaps it was because the police too were
embracing a more human-rights friendly approach. It might also
have been because police were eager to be rid of a rigid point
system that led to demerits if liumang quotas were not met.
Despite some legislators’ concerns, the voices for abolition
prevailed by assuaging fears that repeal would lead to a
116. See Legis. Yuan, 7th Term, 2d Sess., 2d Meeting Rec., 98 LEGIS YUAN GAZ. 501
(2008).
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deterioration in public order and by emphasizing the antiquated
nature of the Liumang Act. On January 23, 2009, the Legislative
Yuan officially voted to repeal the Act. Because most
incarcerated liumang had concurrent criminal sentences, only
176 liumang were actually released upon repeal, providing
persuasive evidence that the Act had become superfluous.
The retirement of the Liumang Act is a testament to the
spirit of legal reform in Taiwan. The executive and legislative
branches both deserve credit for recognizing that the Act had
outlived its time and for carrying out their respective duties in a
democratic, cooperative, and transparent manner. Reformminded scholars and lawyers also deserve praise for pushing the
debate forward even when it was politically unpopular to do so.
That said, the role of the Constitutional Court—and lower court
judges who prompted the Court to take a closer look at the
Liumang Act—deserves special attention both because it is a
shining example of the Court’s willingness to give heft to
constitutional rights in post-martial law Taiwan and because the
Court’s involvement was key to pressuring the other branches to
take action. In large part thanks to the Constitutional Court, the
Liumang Act is now a remnant of history, and that is exactly
what it should be.
VI. CHINA’S RE-EDUCATION THROUGH LABOR
Taiwan was not the only Chinese political system to use a
police-dominated institution to put people behind bars for long
periods. Across the Taiwan Strait, police in the PRC have also
employed a panoply of equivalent, even harsher, measures to
punish those who are deemed “anti-social” by the authorities.
Most notoriously, from the mid-1950s until 2013, they had the
power to dispatch a very broad range of people to what soon
became known as “re-education through labor” (“RETL”),
without the need to gain approval from the procuracy
(prosecuting authorities) or courts, or to allow the intervention
of lawyers. At the time of abolition, the term of such detention
was limited to three years, with a possible extension to a fourth
year by the Committee for the Administration of Re-educationThrough-Labor, which administered RETL sentences. Although
the Committee was composed of police and officials from other
branches of the local government, it was controlled by police in
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reality. Courts could review the detention in accordance with
China’s Administrative Litigation Law (
), but only
after the person had been sent off for “re-education.” That
review process was not invoked in most cases and, even if it
succeeded (as it did only on rare occasions), offered only
modest comfort to a person who had continued to be detained
during the lengthy litigation process.
Similar to the regime for punishing liumang in Taiwan
before its abolition, RETL in China was supposedly a “noncriminal” detention measure for confronting anti-social
conduct. Nevertheless, in certain respects, the RETL sanction
was even more severe than criminal punishment. Many criminals
whose offenses are arguably more harmful to society than those
of RETL offenders find themselves sentenced to far shorter
terms than the maximum three or four years that could be
dispensed to RETL offenders. Domestic and foreign
investigative reports that hit headlines in RETL’s final year of
use vividly demonstrated the brutal conditions in labor camps.117
People subject to RETL recounted exploitive working
conditions, severe beatings and torture imposed on them.118
Over the years, calls for abolishing or reforming RETL
continued. The period of 2003 to 2005 was an initial high point
of the rising tide against RETL. Some optimistic, influential, and
energetic law reformers believed that the time had finally come
to eliminate RETL and put an end to the ability of the police to
impose long-term administrative detention. In 2004, more than
420 delegates to China’s National People’s Congress (“NPC”)
signed a petition calling for the repeal of the RETL system.
The petition, however, failed to sway powerful forces in the
government. In particular, China’s Ministry of Public Security
(“MPS”) was a formidable opponent. The MPS fought to stall
efforts in the NPC to abolish RETL. Yet, in order to comply with
117. Magazine Exposé Reinvigorates Calls to End RTL, DUIHUA HUMAN RTS. J. (Apr.
11, 2013), http://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2013/04/magazine-expose-reinvigoratescalls-to.html.
118. See New Documentaries Take on the Horrors of China’s Labor Camp System, PROBE
INT’L (May 7, 2013), http://journal.probeinternational.org/2013/05/07/newdocumentaries-take-on-the-horrors-of-chinas-labor-camp-system/; see also Steven Jiang,
Chinese Labor Camp Inmate Tells of True Horror of Halloween ‘SOS’, CNN (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/06/world/asia/china-labor-camp-halloweensos/index.html?hpt=hp_c1.
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the demands of current legislation governing deprivations of
liberty, even the MPS acknowledged that, if RETL was to
continue, it must finally be authorized by a law enacted by the
NPC or its Standing Committee. Prior to abolition, the only
authorization for RETL was a smattering of national and local
decisions and regulations.
Although calls for reform of RETL quieted after 2005 and
again after a burst of interest in 2010, they returned with
renewed vigor in 2012, in part due to high profile cases that put
the abuses of the system back in the spotlight. 119 The new
Communist Party leadership, which assumed office in 2012,
responded with a commitment to reform the system. In January
2013, reports briefly surfaced that Meng Jianzhu, the newlyinstalled chair of the powerful Political-Legal Committee of the
Communist Party and recent Minister of Public Security,
directed that the use of RETL be terminated by the end of the
year. In March 2013, after the NPC’s annual meeting, new
Premier Li Keqiang told a press conference that, with respect to
RETL reform, “the relevant departments are working intensively
to formulate a plan, and it may be laid out before the end of this
year.”120 Also in early 2013, a number of provinces and cities,
including Guangdong, Yunnan, Hunan, Shandong and
Shenzhen, stopped approving RETL cases, and some labor
camps in these places were transitioned into compulsory drug
treatment centers.121
119. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Labor Camps Widens in China, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/opposition-to-laborcamps-widens-in-china.html?_r=0; Keith Zhai, Rape Victim’s Mother Tang Hui Wins
Damages Over Labour Camp Sentence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 16, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1283035/rape-victims-mother-tang-huiwins-appeal-landmark-labour-camp.
120. Premier Li Keqiang Meets the Press Today, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 17, 2013), http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/17/content_16314566.htm.
121. Yunnan Jiao Ting Laojiao Shenpi Zhongguo Kaiqi Laojiao Gaige Guanjian Yi Bu
(
) [Yunnan’s Suspending of Approval of
RETL Sentences is a Key Step in China’s Reforming of RETL] (Feb. 6, 2013), http://
www.chinanews.com/fz/2013/02-06/4554405.shtml; see Shandong Sheng Yi Zanting
Laodong Jiaoyang Shenpi (
) [Shandong Province Suspends
Approval of RETL Sentences] (July 24, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201307/24/c_116671976.htm; see also Verna Yu, Labour Camps May Become a Thing of a Past,
But What Will Replace Them?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 5, 2013), http://
www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/1347815/labour-camps-may-become-thingpast-what-will-replace-them?utm_source=edm; Laojiao Gaige Fang’an huo Quanhui Hou
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In October, Zhou Qiang, the new President of the Supreme
People’s Court, asked the courts to “actively cooperate in the
anticipated reform of RETL, explore and improve institutions to
speed up trials of minor criminal cases, and to vigorously
promote community correction work.”122 This was the first sign
of the judiciary’s involvement in broader reforms regarding
RETL since the new leadership put forth its reform agenda.
Zhou was obviously preparing the criminal courts to expect a
serious increase in their burdens because many offenders
previously sent to RETL would soon be prosecuted instead. Yet
there were still reports that the new President, Xi Jinping, was
encountering daunting opposition from conservatives
challenging his resolve to abolish RETL.123
Reformist hopes were rekindled in November 2013 when
the Decision of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central
Committee announced the Party’s intent to end RETL.124 The
Decision—a key document setting forth the Party’s broad
strategy in economic and social affairs—did not include a
timeline for abolition or a clear statement of what would happen
to people currently undergoing RETL. And, despite great
fanfare in the media regarding the leadership’s call for
abolition, the actual substance of the proposed legislative
reform was murky.
After years of false starts for reforms, opponents of RETL
had learned to keep their expectations modest. It therefore
came as a pleasant surprise when the government followed up
on its pledge and, at the end of December 2013, declared the
Chutai (
) [Reform of RETL to be Introduced After Plenum]
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.dfdaily.com/html/33/2013/11/7/1085027.shtml.
122. Zui Gao Fa: Peihe Laojiao Gaige Tansuo Wanshan Qingwei Xing An Kuai Shen
Kuai Jie Jihzhi (
) [Supreme People’s
Court: Supporting Reform of RETL by Exploring and Perfecting the System for Swiftly Handling
Minor Criminal Cases], XINHUA (Oct. 23, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/
2013-10/23/c_117844201.htm [hereinafter Supreme People’s Court: Supporting
Reform of RETL].
123. Benjamin Kang Lim & Ben Blanchard, Insight—Failure to End China’s Labor
Camps Shows Limits of Xi’s Power, REUTERS (INDIA), (Nov. 6, 2013), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/us-china-politics-xi-insight-idUSBRE9A514U201
31106.
124. Hannah Beech, China to Close Notorious Re-Education Through Labor Camps,
TIME (Nov. 16, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/11/16/china-to-close-notorious-reeducation-through-labor-camps/.
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end of RETL. 125 The official government media announced,
“After abolition, those still serving Laojiao [RETL] time will be
set free. Their remaining terms will not be enforced.”126 This
announcement was welcome and overdue. What the
government failed to clarify, however, was how the types of
people whom the authorities previously sent to RETL would be
handled in the future.
Over the years, reformers had proposed different options
for either modifying RETL or replacing it with alternative
sanctions, including enacting the Law for the Correction of
Unlawful Conduct (
) to replace RETL, reducing
the maximum term of RETL from three years to eighteen
months or even a year, alleviating the harshness of the sanction
by allowing RETL prisoners more freedom, restricting police
discretion by clarifying criteria for determining what kind of
conduct and what type of person should be subject to RETL,
improving the examination and approval procedures, and
partially judicializing the process by requiring that in every case
some type of court review take place before a person was
consigned to RETL’s administrative punishment.127
Some reformers took a more radical approach, proposing
to transform future RETL decisions by the police into mere
recommendations and to give the decision-making power to the
courts. In fact, the draft of the Law for the Correction of
Unlawful Conduct, which had twice been included into the
NPC’s legislative agenda in 2005 and 2010, reportedly included
such an arrangement. Yet, the draft was stalled because no
consensus could be reached on whether the decision-making
power should be shifted from the police to the courts.128 Pilot
125. Zhu Ningzhu, China Abolishes Reeducation Through Labor, XINHUA (Dec. 28,
2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/28/c_133003042.htm.
126. Id.
127. For a detailed discussion of proposed legal reforms, see SARAH BIDDULPH,
LEGAL REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION POWER IN CHINA (2007).
128. Weifa Xingwei Jiaozhi Fa Shifou Xuyao Zhiding Hai Xu Tongchou Kaolu (
) [Comprehensive Consideration Still Needed to Decide
Whether to Enact the Law for the Correction of Unlawful Conduct] (Mar. 9, 2013), http://
lianghui.people.com.cn/2013npc//2013/0309/c358677-20734160.html; Weifa Xingwei
Jiaozhi Fa Nanchan Bei Shi Wei Laojiao Zhidu Zhongjie Zhe (
) [Deemed Terminator of RETL, The Law for the Correction of Unlawful
Conduct Yet to Pass], XINHUA (Aug. 16, 2012) http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/201208/16/c_112738640.htm.
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projects on “education and correction of unlawful conduct”
were the subject of experiments in four cities in 2011, but little is
known about the content of these projects and whether the
judiciary was given the power to determine RETL sentences.129 It
was not until the remarks of the President of the Supreme
People’s Court in 2013 that it looked likely courts would soon
step in and handle criminal prosecutions of many offenders who
were previously processed as RETL targets.
The final announcement of RETL’s repeal in December
2013 rightly met with praise from within the PRC and beyond.
The passing of RETL into history removed a longstanding
method of violating human rights and brought the PRC one
step closer towards ratification of the ICCPR. The government’s
decision to abolish rather than modify RETL of course also
ended the debate regarding the possibility of more modest
reforms to the sanction. But abolition did not end the broader
conversation regarding the state’s ability to deprive people of
liberty for various anti-social conduct.
Now that RETL has been abolished, people who previously
fell within its scope are being shifted to other forms of social
controls. To be clear, we are not arguing that the all types of
people previously handled by the RETL system should be set
free without any government monitoring or more serious forms
of intervention. The concern, however, is that the fanfare of
RETL’s demise might mask persisting issues with deprivations of
liberty that meet neither the PRC’s Criminal Procedure Law nor
international human rights norms with which the PRC
government itself has stated its intent to comply.
For example, most ordinary drug offenders, who
constituted a major part of the group sent every year to such reeducation, will probably be confined in existing administrative
treatment centers for up to six months or a year rather than sent
to court, and the same can be expected for commercial sex
workers. Even prior to abolition of RETL, international nongovernmental organizations were already raising concerns about
the use of “custody and education”—another police controlled
129. Si Shi Shidian Laojiao Zhidu Gaige You Weifa Xingwei Jiaoyu Jiaozhi Qudai (
) [Four Cities Reforming RETL by Replacing It
with Education and Correction of Unlawful Conduct], (Aug. 29, 2012) http://
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-08/29/c_123642847.htm.
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sanction—to detain commercial sex workers for months at a
time.130 Lawyers within China have similarly called for an end to
the practice.131
A miscellany of other petty offenders who do not respond
well to the fifteen-day maximum detention currently dispensed
by the police under the Security Administration Punishment Act
(
) may find themselves in “legal education”
centers or other types of “community correction” units that have
detained people for longer periods without judicial approval or
lawyer’s intervention.132 Others have found themselves detained
for only a few days under the guise of “legal study classes” even
if not sent away for longer stays at special centers.133
Moreover, despite a new mental health law, police are likely
to continue the involuntary commitment to psychiatric hospitals
of certain political dissidents, religious or Falun Gong
adherents, and other recalcitrants. 134 They may also be

130. See “Custody and Education”: Arbitrary Detention for Female Sex Workers in China,
ASIA C ATALYST (Dec. 2013), http://asiacatalyst.org/blog/2013/12/report-custody-andeducation-arbitrary-detention-for-female-sex-workers-in-china.html (“However, largely
unknown to the general public, similar administrative penalties [to reeducation
through labor] remain in effect, including the Custody & Education (C&E) system
targeting commercial sex workers and their clients.”).
131. Lushi Jianyi Chexiao “Maiyin Piaochang Renyuan Shourong Jiaoyu Banfa” (
) [Lawyers Suggest Revoking The Measures on
Custody and Education of Commercial Sex Workers], http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__ biz=
MzA5NjM1NzUwOA==&mid=200286955&idx=3&sn=9e1a0ba640b30d4a758f93e35
87e2f86&scene=1&from=groupmessage&isappinstalled=0#rd.
132. See, e.g., Xin Yu (
), “Jiao Zheng Fa” Ke Zhi Shequ Jianyu Hua? Gongmin
Huyu Renda Tingzhi Shenyi (
)
The Law for the Correction May Turn Communities to Prisons? Citizens Call For People’s
Congress to Stop Reviewing (the Draft)], RADIO FREE ASIA (Feb. 27 2014),
http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/renquanfazhi/sy-02272014101150.html.
133. See Donald Clarke, Why Chinese Needs a Good Word for “Irony”, and Why it’s Too
Soon to Bid Farewell to Re-education Through Labor, CHINESE LAW PROF BLOG (Nov. 28,
2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2013/11/why-chineseneeds-a-good-word-for-irony-and-why-its-too-soon-to-bid-farewell-to-re-educationthrough.html.
134. “The Darkest Corners”: Abuses of Involuntary Psychiatric Commitment in China,
AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www2.amnesty.org.uk/blogs/countdownchina/%E2%80%9C-darkest-corners%E2%80%9D-abuses-involuntary-psychiatriccommitment-china.
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increasingly tempted to resort to many forms of illegal
detention, ranging from kidnapping to “black jails.”135
Prominent among other politically disempowered groups
are petitioners, often penniless, who are protesting allegedly
illegal land takings and other abuses of power by local officials.
Human rights organizations have documented numerous
instances of petitioners being detained or forcefully returned to
their home provinces.136
At the other end of the power spectrum, even high-ranking
Party members face their own forms of sanctions without
procedural protections. It would have been surprising to find
government officials in a RETL facility, but it is nonetheless
worth noting the continuing use of severe Party-administered
deprivations of liberty that lack any judicial intervention.137
Finally, a number of questions remain for those cases that
formerly would be siphoned to RETL but will now be handled
through the formal criminal justice system instead of an
alternative administrative system. Will they receive the full
process provided for in the Criminal Procedure Law,
recognizing that many barriers remain to accessing evidence,
witnesses, and other information crucial to mounting an
effective defense?138 Or will they be subject to the truncated
“simplified procedures” as provided in the Criminal Procedure
Law or the new, experimental “simple and fast” criminal process
(
that is being used to speed up the adjudication of
minor crimes that are punishable by three years’ imprisonment
or less? The President of the Supreme People’s Court
emphasized the significance of this speedy process as a reform

135. Sophie Richardson, Dispatches: Casting a Light into China’s Black Jails, HUMAN
RTS. WATCH (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/dispatchescasting-light-china-s-black-jails.
136. See China: Rampant Violence and Intimidation Against Petitioners, HUMAN RTS.
WATCH (Dec. 9, 2005), http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/12/07/china-rampantviolence-and-intimidation-against-petitioners; see also China Bans Petitioners Appealing
Directly to Higher Authorities, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2014, 11:54 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/us-china-petitioners-idUSBREA3N08120140424.
137. See Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFO.
7, 7 (2008) (highlighting the fact that the Party has the power to detain officials
suspected of corruption).
138. See, e.g., MIKE MCCONVILLE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA: AN EMPIRICAL
INQUIRY 5 (2011) (examining these concerns from an empirical perspective).
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initiative that is intended to supplement the abolition of
RETL.139
It is hardly surprising that the PRC is finding ways to push
minor cases through the criminal justice system: the United
States, for example, relies overwhelmingly on guilty pleas and
Taiwan allows “negotiation procedures” for minor offenses.140
What remains to be seen with China is what shape Chinese “plea
bargaining” or other rapid forms of case resolution will take.
Recent reports that some localities are using criminal
detention—which allows police to hold suspects up to thirty
days—as a replacement for RETL indicate that perhaps a tool
meant for use during the investigation phase is itself being
turned into a form of punishment.141
In short, there remain more questions than answers about
what RETL’s abolition means for the thousands of cases that
would annually fall under its umbrella. Without a clear vision for
what a RETL-free PRC will look like, we must wait and see
whether China’s leadership will finally leave RETL to the history
books in substance as well as name, as its neighbor across the
strait has already done.
Despite the major political, legal, economic, and social
differences between Taiwan and the PRC, Taiwan’s example can
be of great assistance to those Mainland law reformers
concerned with what alternatives are filling the gap left by the
end of RETL. In China, legal reforms on paper have often failed
to strengthen significantly the ability of people accused of
criminal or quasi-criminal violations to challenge the
government’s case in practice. Thus, there is reason to question
whether the end of RETL merely “changed the soup but not the
medicine” (
)or, in terms more familiar to English
readers, put old wine in new bottles.142

139. Supreme People’s Court: Supporting Reform of RETL, supra note 122.
140. See Lewis, supra note 13.
141. Verna Yu, How China Using Criminal Detention in Place of Re-education Through
Labour, S. CHINA MORNING POST, (April 21, 2014, 3:21 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1492192/china-using-criminal-detention-place-re-educationthrough-labour.
142. CORINNA-BARBARA FRANCIS, AMNESTY INT’L, CHANGING THE SOUP BUT NOT
THE MEDICINE: ABOLISHING RE-EDUCATION THROUGH LABOUR IN CHINA (2013),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA17/042/2013/en.
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Taiwan’s experience offers a tested roadmap for gradually
reducing arbitrary police powers. For example, knowledge of
Taiwan’s former bureaucratic procedures for determining who
should be deemed a liumang, and to what extent, may prove
useful as the PRC considers how to improve the criteria and the
procedures for deciding who should be subject to RETL’s
successors. Indeed, the Taiwan precedent of classifying
offenders into two categories and subjecting only those in the
second, more serious category to incarceration may stimulate
new Mainland thinking about how to reduce the numbers of
those who are to suffer long-term administrative detention,
numbers that have been far larger in the PRC than in Taiwan.
Now that the heads of the local public security apparatus in
China appear to be playing at least a slightly diminished role in
the extremely powerful Party political-legal committees that
control the administration of justice, the time might finally be
right to start making inroads into the overwhelming police
influence over decisions when to deprive people of physical
liberty because of allegedly dangerous behavior.
As we have suggested, Taiwan’s former administrative
procedures left much to be desired in terms of their fairness to
potential targets of the system. Yet Mao himself once exhorted
“We have had a good many teachers by negative example.” We
hope that Mainland legislators will regard Taiwan’s now
abolished procedures not as favorable precedents to be followed
indefinitely but rather as negative examples to be increasingly
avoided. The predecessor of the Liumang Act was first
promulgated in 1955, a repressive era under Chiang Kai-shek’s
iron-fist rule. By the time of the Liumang Act’s abolition, it was
deemed a remnant of the past that no longer fit Taiwan’s
impressive progress toward the rule of law. RETL, similarly, was
officially established in a turbulent, nightmarish era of the PRC’s
history. Slowly it, too, became viewed by many in China as
seriously inappropriate in light of their country’s social and
economic progress and heightened awareness of the importance
of protections against arbitrary police conduct. Such an evolving
consensus added to the reform momentum, as has been
demonstrated in Taiwan’s case.
The very inadequacies of the Liumang Act spurred an
earlier generation of Taiwan reformers to insist upon some form
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of judicial review of the relevant administrative decisions,
leading to the establishment of the “security tribunals” in the
local district courts. One of the key questions confronting those
Mainland legislators and officials who, despite the formal end of
RETL, wish to retain long-term administrative detention but in
some modified form is whether the present system of allowing
judicial review in principle, albeit restricted in practice, should
be replaced by a system of compulsory judicial review in every
case. If so, they will have to determine the nature of that judicial
review. Should it take the form of the existing review prescribed
by the PRC’s Administrative Litigation Law? If all administrative
incarceration decisions are to be reviewed, that would add
substantially to the burdens of the court system unless the
number of targets is substantially reduced. Or should some
specially adapted, more abbreviated, procedures be devised to
help the courts discharge the expanded duties contemplated?
In this respect also, the Taiwan experience would be very
relevant. Knowledge of the origins, operation, advantages,
disadvantages, and demise of the “security tribunals” should
prove highly instructive. Again, the special court procedures
used for liumang cases, if properly assessed in accordance with
rule of law values, should be regarded as a negative example.
Despite the authorized participation of defense counsel, the
failure of the “security tribunals” to provide accused liumang
with other procedural protections provided to accused criminals
gave them much of the appearance and reality of the very
inquisitorial judicial system that Taiwan’s criminal justice
reforms of the past decade were designed to eradicate.
Especially appalling were the severe limitations upon the
opportunities for the target and his counsel to identify and
cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Given existing political constraints and other distorting
influences upon PRC courts, which significantly diminish
prospects for independent judicial action, it would be most
unfortunate if the PRC should establish the equivalent of
Taiwan’s “security tribunals” to review decisions to send people
to “custody and education,” “community corrections,” or other
forms of non-criminal deprivations of liberty. That would
impose further restrictions on fair court procedures while
misleading the public into thinking that adequate court review
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was being granted. It would be far better for China’s judicial
resources to be expanded to ensure that all decisions imposing
or recommending restraints on liberty will receive in practice
the same judicial review as currently available in principle under
the Administrative Litigation Law. Taking reforms a step
further, it would be even better if witnesses regularly appeared
in court for many types of cases under both the Administrative
Litigation Law and Criminal Procedure Law, as compared with
current practice where witnesses are nearly always absent.
Of course, real change will also require that judges not only
be adequate in numbers but also be willing to stand up to the
police who bring cases before them. We recognize that
empowering the Chinese judiciary to take a more assertive
position vis-à-vis the police would be no easy task. Nonetheless,
making sure that there are adequate numbers of judges to give
each case serious scrutiny is a necessary first step. Our hope is
that the prospect of a meaningful judicial review in every case
where administrative detention is decided upon or
recommended by the police will stimulate police to be more
cautious in their appraisals and reduce the number of cases that
come before the court.
From a broader perspective, what might China learn from
our examination of the life and death of the Liumang Act?
Apart from the desirability of completely abolishing long-term
administrative detention, we believe the attention of people in
Mainland China should focus on the roles that democratic
political-legal institutions played in its gradual reform and
ultimate demise. Especially prominent was the role of Taiwan’s
Constitutional Court, an institution that, sadly, has no
counterpart on the Mainland, where the Standing Committee of
the NPC has the exclusive power to interpret the Constitution
but, in practice, does not exercise it.
For a long period under the KMT dictatorship in Taiwan,
the Constitutional Court served as mere window dressing for the
system’s rule of law charade. Yet, as the martial law regime
began to unravel, the Court began to spread its wings and
increasingly demonstrate a capacity for imaginatively and
vigorously holding the other branches of government to the
legal standards of government under law. In fact, many of the
Constitutional Court’s new interpretations stimulated, indeed
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insisted upon, further reforms in accordance with the Justices’
impressive knowledge not only of the ROC’s Constitution but
also of the governments and legal systems of the principal
Western democracies. The publishing of Justices’ concurring
and dissenting opinions as well as the Constitutional Court’s
majority opinion has further spurred a robust debate over the
meaning of the provisions enshrined in Taiwan’s Constitution.
As we have shown earlier, the Constitutional Court’s deft
handling of the sensitive problems of long-term administrative
detention, beginning in 1995 with the first of three
interpretations that ultimately led to abolition, is a prime
illustration of how constitutionalism can fruitfully take root in
Chinese political-legal culture and benefit the development of
democratic government and the rule of law. The Court’s
interpretations wisely selected from and responded to the broad
range of requests presented to it by increasingly energetic legal
and judicial experts. Those interpretations made clear that
many of the features of the Liumang Act were inconsistent with
the basic values of Taiwan’s rapidly evolving democratic system.
The Constitutional Court therefore required the legislature,
with the assistance of the executive, to revise the offending
provisions within a reasonable time.
The Constitutional Court’s handling of these cases also
illustrates the limits under which it exercises its powers. Despite
the many constitutional failings of the Liumang Act, the Court
did not believe itself free to invalidate the legislation in its
entirety. Nor did it assert the power to address issues that were
not raised by the applications for review that had been
submitted. These constraints left the overall fate of this
politically sensitive legislation to the democratically elected
branches of government, and in 2009, as we have seen, the
newly-elected KMT administration and the KMT-dominated
legislature obliged by abolishing it. In this instance, the three
main branches of the ROC’s distinctive system of five branches
of government performed in textbook fashion.
This example of the separation of powers among Taiwan’s
main branches of government and the ability of the
Constitutional Court to act as a powerful final arbiter of
constitutional issues—including operationalizing rights set forth
in the ROC Constitution—is currently impossible to replicate in
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the PRC. There, at best, the branches exercise a separation of
functions under the nominal control of the NPC and its
Standing Committee, which, like the other branches, are under
the actual control of the Communist Party. As a result, the exact
contours of an RETL-free PRC will be shaped by political forces
instead of by judicial action.
Although this case history of the recent constitutional
process in Taiwan should be of enormous interest to Mainland
reformers, in the present political climate there is little prospect
that the PRC is ready to consider establishment of a similar
constitutional court. The most that many experts think feasible
might be the authorization of a constitutional committee within
the NPC that would scrutinize all proposed legislation in order
to determine whether any provisions in the draft are
inconsistent with the Constitution. Even that may well be more
than China’s current leaders are prepared to support.
CONCLUSION
We began this study when the Liumang Act was still in force
in Taiwan and RETL was still being used in the PRC. We now
find ourselves concluding a project that first turned into a
historical piece for Taiwan and then, several years later, for the
PRC. Despite these welcome developments, challenges remain
on both sides of the strait. Taiwan continues to grapple with
reforms to its criminal justice system, such as introducing citizen
participation through a type of consultative jury, and with
broader issues of how to accommodate demands for greater
citizen participation in the government, as demonstrated during
the Sunflower Movement’s occupation of the Legislative Yuan in
March-April 2014. But these issues are part of healthy, open
debates in a democratic society, not manifestations of
entrenched police repression. The demise of the Liumang Act
marked the disappearance of one of the last clear vestiges of
Taiwan’s authoritarian past. In contrast, the end of RETL
removed but one of many controversial practices that can be
used to restrict people’s liberty with few if any checks to ensure
the decision comports with even the limited protections in the
PRC’s Criminal Procedure Law.
We hope that our study offers further support for the true
demise of RETL, meaning in substance as well as in name, and
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the establishment of at least a constitutional committee within
the NPC, if not an independent constitutional court. We also
hope that the new Xi Jinping leadership has the wisdom to see
that other forms of unfettered police powers should likewise
become relics of the past. Surely there are many Taiwan legal
experts across the strait who are willing and able to provide
valuable advice on charting a path forward now that RETL
belongs to the PRC’s past.
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